Annex No. 1 to
20 February 1945 Historical Report
No.1 (informal) DEFENSE OF THE MONSCHAU SECTOR
BY 38TH CAV RCN SQN

SPECIFIC DATA: During the 16th, 17th and 18th of December 1944, the Germans launched a full scale offensive in the Monschau sector in an effort to secure the Monschau-Eupen highway for future mechanized. operations of the 2nd Panzer Division then assembled in the Dedenborn-Dreiborn area. The 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized), defending this sector with a strength of about 700 men and officers (less attachments) occupied a line on a front of over 9,000 yards , from the town of Monschau (inclusive) to Lammersdorf (exclusive). All elements of the squadron, then on its 107th consecutive day of enemy contact, were employed facing the fortified positions of the Siegfried Line less than 1000 yards away. The 3rd Platoon, Company A, 112th Engineer (C) Battalion was attached to the Squadron as well as liaison and forward observer parties from the 62nd Field Artillery Battalion, then attached to the 102nd Cavalry Group, and Company A, 146th Engineer (C) Battalion.

On 13 December 1944, the 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment was withdrawn from supporting positions astride the Monschau-Eupen road and the squadron became. the only unit in this sector between the German lines and Eupen. During the period l3-14-l5 December 1944 there was. a marked increase in enemy activity and the attached engineer platoon was employed constantly, day and night, strengthening the Squadron's defensive wire, mine and flare fields. The fire missions of Troop E (Assault Gun Troop) and of the 62nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion i ncreased about 300% and additional listening posts were established well in front of the Squadron line. On the night of 15-16 December 1944, much enemy air activity was noted over the Squadron area, accompanied by an unusual use of pyrotechnics. Reports of German paratroop landings began to filter down from higher headquarters, and all personnel. waited the coming daylight, on 16 December 1944, in a state of tense and alert expectancy.

16 December On 16 December 1944, the enemy struck. During the three day period which followed the Germans made five desperate attempts to penetrate the Squadron lines and secure the Monschau-Eupen highway. These attacks ranged from a frontal assault, in battalion strength, to combined frontal and enveloping attacks employing elements of two regiments (751st and 762nd Regiment, 326th VolksGrenadier Division).

Early. on the morning of 16 December 1944, the enemy preceded his attack by a thirty-five minute artillery, mortar and rocket barrage of unprecedented severity. It was an obvious and effective attempt to isolate the Monschau sector by fire; all telephone communications were destroyed and the main supply route denied by a series of time-on target concentrations, which were followed throughout the day by severe interdictory and harassing fires.

At 0615A, the enemy attacked Monschau from the east in battalion strength, employing both battalion and regimental support weapons. Gallantly and skillfully, the thinly spread tank and reconnaissance platoons met and repulsed this numerically superior force in complete darkness. On the southeast of the town, noncommissioned officers, of necessity commanding the defenses of these strategic approaches, displayed outstanding combat proficiency. The approach of a company of enemy infantry from Menzerath, Hammer and Rohren was detected only a few minutes before contact was established. Coolly, and with grim determination, the scattered cavalry outposts allowed the enemy to approach through these canalized routes until he was on their outer wire defenses. Then, at a given signal, all weapons opened up at point blank range. In the light of 60mm mortar illuminating shells, the Germans were seen to be in headlong retreat back along the Rohren and Hammer roads. More than thirteen of the enemy were killed by this fire in a space of less than five minutes and two prisoners were taken.

Simultaneously with the above attack, a larger enemy force concentrated on the high ground east and northeast of Monschau, and deployed to attack from the dragon's teeth and the "snake road" (K-947196) leading from Imgenbroich. Here the enemy assaulting infantry was pinned down by machine gun fire from trench positions in this area until forward observers from the squadron assault gun troop and the 62nd Armored Plaid Artillery could adjust on the target. In this manner the German attack was broken up at ranges of from 200 to 800 yards. The enemy was unable to close with the lightly held line and the attack was repulsed. At 0745A, coming from the Menzerath Hill in stronger force, the enemy partially succeeded in driving a wedge up the bed of the Roer River and within the cavalry outpost. The force of this attack was broken largely by the fire of a machine gun dismounted from one of the tanks defending the draw, reinforced by tank fire.

For the balance of the day the Germans kept up strong patrolling and sniper action. Our forces employed artillery fire and aggressive patrol action to prevent and break up the assembly of enemy troops on the squadron front. Observation posts and outposts reported the filling of pillboxes by the Germans and all intelligence pointed towards another attack to come. Every effort was made to bolster the Squadron's thinly spread defense and immediate reinforcement was requested of the 102nd Cavalry Group. In answer to the last request, Company A, 146th Engineer (C) Battalion was attached and reported to the Squadron Commander at about 1700A 16 December 1944. Two platoons were attached to troops in the line and a third dug in in supporting positions on the high ground west of Monschau, in Squadron reserve.

Again, the night of 16-17 December was marked by unusual enemy air activity and the use of many varied types of pyrotechnics. Large, low flying enemy airplanes passed over all troops, flying from east to west and returning; some dropped flares and others carried wing lights. Patrols and listening posts were put out in greater numbers and indications of enemy troop movement were reported during the night.

17 December

At 0400A, on 17 December 1944, a listening post just west of Menzarath (K-948189) detected a large body of enemy (estimated to be sixty or seventy) approaching from that town. In the darkness, the listening post was very nearly overrun and the personnel were forced to engage in a fire fight for their own self protection. Although faced with tremendous odds, they courageously maintained their vantage point and adjusted artillery fire by radio which inflicted severe casualties, and forced the enemy to withdraw.

Two and one half hours, later the enemy attacked, accompanied by a repetition of the previous day's preparation barrage. Initially, three battalions attacked on all troop fronts from Monschau to Konzen and, simultaneously, enemy paratroopers of Colonel Von der Heydte's paratroop regiment became active in rear f the cavalry lines. The main attack developed, in regimental strength, to the north of Monschau in an effort to gain the dominating Mutzenich Hill and thus sever the Monschau-Eupen highway. Other points on the squadron front were subjected to strong and well organized assaults by forces ranging from company to battalion strength. Enemy small arms fire became severe and all advances by the Germans were supported by direct as well as indirect artillery fires.

In successive waves, the numerically superior enemy drove against, among, and through the beleaguered cavalry positions. Despite the odds, the troopers and their reinforcements fought with strength, courage, and determination.

Light tanks defending the northern approaches to Monschau met the first thrust of the German attack just before dawn. Gaining the element of surprise by virtue of their well camouflaged positions, the tankers skillfully employed every available weapon and effectively turned back over a company of the enemy. Heavy casualties were inflicted and an early attempt to sever the MSR at this point was denied.

As the attacking infantry pressed north of Mutzenich, they commenced to infiltrate among the small farms on the outskirts of that town. Outposts were partially cut off and subjected to flanking fire. Fighting in small groups, these men refused to give ground which would have further exposed their comrades. Strong points were established by as few as four men and tenaciously held out while one hard pressed platoon which had had its line penetrated counterattacked to restore its positions. Armored cars were employed to attack the advancing enemy and the wedges were effectively driven out.

At one point the Germans succeeded in crossing the main supply route, at the northern edge of Monschau, under heavy supporting fire and established a machine gun position within the defensive positions at this point. As. in the several other instances of this nature, the cavalrymen held their ground, and the enemy position was eliminated by four tank crewmen who flanked and charged the German machine gun with small arms and hand grenades.

Forward observers, both from the Squadron Assault Gun Troop and from supporting artillery units were mainly instrumental in breaking up the formation of enemy support and reserve troops which followed the main effort of the attack. All of these forward observation parties were forced to engage in fire fights at one time or another, in order to maintain their positions and protect themselves and their equipment.

North of Mutzenich, where five reconnaissance platoons defended a front. of 6000 yards, the Germans achieved a penetration in force. More than sixty five of the attacking infantry gained the dense forest behind the cavalry positions and elements of the German paratroops dropped the preceding night also engaged the desperately fighting platoons from the rear. Observation posts of the 82nd Armored Field Artillery, 186th Field Artillery and the 9 55th Field Artillery Battalion were driven out and overrun by the advancing Germans. Despite these numerous and formidable enemy threats, all lines and positions were maintained with grim determination and existing gaps sealed by employment of the attached engineers. Later in the day, added reinforcements in the form of Company A., 47th Armored Infantry arrived and deployed in the heavily wooded area of the break-through to clean up all enemy resistance in this sector. These reinforcements later joined forces with the cavalry and assisted in strengthening their lines.

At the height of the enemy's main effort, and as German support battalions commenced to move up in the area north of Mutzenich and Monschau, all available personnel were turned out to provide last ditch security. Rear echelon maintenance and supply sections were employed as command post security and prisoner of war guards. Soldiers being treated at the Squadron Aid Station, adjacent to the command post, were directed to rejoin their units. All prisoner of war statements indicated that an armored attack by the 2nd SS Panzer Division was to follow the infantry assault that same day and the Squadron prepared to hold at all cost.

From 0650A to 1500A the fighting continued with tremendous odds being thrown against the cavalry front. Gradually the courageous and determined platoons gained local control and artillery observers were enabled to place accurate fire on German troop concentrations as well as on routes of approach and supply.

At 1500A, the beaten enemy commenced to withdraw under the constant pressure of artillery, mortar, tank and machine gun fire. Two hours later the reinforcing infantry troops (Company A, 47th Armored Infantry) who had been cleaning up in the woods west of the Squadron, came through and were integrated among the platoons for the night. Ten medium tanks were also placed in support of the line. The Squadron, still in its original positions, consolidated for the expected armored- threat.

As darkness fell, listening posts were put out, and patrols sent into enemy territory. At 2100A the Germans struck again. A large enemy force was detected approaching Monschau from the vicinity of Imgenbroich and immediately illuminated by flares and 60mm mortar illuminating shells. In the resulting light approximately two hundred Germans were taken under fire by the squadron's forward observers, and by tanks and machine guns.

The engagement lasted for approximately forty five minutes, after which the enemy withdrew with severe losses. Main at 2230A, listening posts reported the approach of large numbers of troops from the direction of Imgenbroich, and again heavy fire was placed on an estimated of one hundred of the enemy, under the light of the 60mm mortar illuminating shells. Many casualties were observed and the German attackers dispersed.

18 December

At 0300A, 18 December 1944, the enemy artillery and rocket barrage fell on the Monschau and Hofen areas which preceded an attack on the 395th Infantry defending Hofen Hill. A reinforced battalion, followed by tanks, attempted to envelop the Monschau area from the south in a third desperate maneuver to seize the Monschau-Eupen road. Right flank elements of the squadron south of Monschau and on the Hofen Hill were engaged by enemy direct artillery fire and infantry action. At 1060A, the Germans had achieved a penetration among the infantry's positions and units adjacent to the cavalrymen were withdrawn to be used elsewhere in a counterattacking role. Simultaneously the weakened left flank of the infantry was subjected to a frontal attack. Marshaling their scant forces, the cavalrymen filled the gap and repelled this attack by the skillful coordination of all available weapons including artillery.

Despite the terrific pressure under which the squadron fought against a numerically superior enemy, all elements maintained complete control and communications throughout the three days operations. This communication involved the maintenance of over fifty miles of telephone wire, sixty five telephones and six switchboards, for which no personnel are assigned or trained within a cavalry squadron. In addition there were sixteen active radio nets, incorporating approximate sixty-three radio nets. As a result the Squadron Commander was enabled, at all times, to present a clear and comprehensive picture of the situation to the Cavalry Group Commander, and to conduct a coordinated defense.

The successful defense of the wide sector entrusted to the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized] was due to the spontaneous, intelligent and combat wise performance of a great number of small groups of men with every platoon committed, without supports, and with only an engineer platoon in reserve it was the heavy sense of r esponsibility and the combat skill of each man on the line which maintained the integrity of the position. The 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized), in the performance of its mission over the period of 16-18 December 1944, displayed outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy and achieved a brilliant success in stopping the full scale German offensive in the Monschau sector.

The significance of this is best brought out by the statement of Major August Braunwarth, commanding the 54th Werfer Regiment, who was captured on 13 January 1945, at Mont le Ban, to the effect that: 'We failed because our right flank near Monschau ran its head against a wall' (First U.S. Army PWI Reports 15 January 1945). The gallantry and outstanding performance of duty of the officers and men of the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized) reflect great credit upon themselves and their organization, and is in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Army.

The following units and individuals were attached to the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized) during the period 16-18 December 1944.

• 3rd Platoon, Company A, 112th Engineer (C) Battalion, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Morris Krupnick
• Company A, 146th Engineer (C) Battalion, commanded by Captain Sam H. Ball Jr.