CHINESE MISFORTUNE COOKIE Events At Los Alamos Portend Interesting Times By Edward Zehr The story continues to develop about a Taiwan-born scientist, Wen Ho Lee, who allegedly gave the Communist Chinese the technical information they needed to build their version of the U.S.- designed W-88 nuclear warhead. This weapon is miniaturized so that multiple warheads may be carried on a single launch vehicle. This has greatly accelerated the Chinese effort to produce a multiple, independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) that can be used to obliterate targets in this country. According to Jeff Gerth of the New York Times, Chinese warhead development had lagged a generation behind that of the U.S. due to their inability to produce small warheads that could take out a number of targets after being dispensed from a single launch vehicle. By mid-decade, however, the Chinese had built and tested such warheads, and U.S. officials believe that their rapid progress was facilitated by secrets they obtained from a spy at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. The Clinton administration has finally bestirred itself from its indolent torpor to see about locking the barn door now that the livestock are grazing far afield. Although the espionage was discovered in 1995, they have only begun to respond to it since the story broke in the mainstream press. And, of course, they have a ready explanation: it's all the fault of George Bush and Ronald Reagan -- the espionage began in the 1980s. Unfortunately, there is a bit more to the story than that. Three years is a long time to leave a spy roaming around amongst the classified data; what was the administration doing all that time? Covering up, according to Oliver North, who recently wrote in the online publication NewsMax that the Intelligence Chief of the Energy Department, Notra Trulock, was demoted when he gave a briefing to Congress on the spy situation after being ordered not to do so. Granted that the executive branch has the right to enforce its directives, but Congress has the responsibility to exercise oversight in such matters as espionage. Trulock gave secret testimony last fall to a select congressional committee. According to a recent New York Times article by James Risen and Jeff Gerth, the bipartisan panel issued a unanimous secret report that endorsed Trulock's conclusions regarding Chinese spying. Taking issue with the White House's view, the panel saw clear implications in the espionage case for U.S.-China policy, and has now made dozens of policy-related recommendations, officials said. Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, Chairman of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee told North that this failure of security had not been reported to Congress. He speculated that the Clinton administration kept quiet about it in order to avoid possible impact on its foreign policy. The Wall Street Journal reported more than a week ago that an Energy Department intelligence official alerted the White House about the spy at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, and the warning was relayed to Frederico Pena, who was at the time head of the Department of Energy, yet the Clinton administration failed to react. According to Sen. Richard Shelby (R-AL), the administration neglected to implement the FBI's recommendations for more stringent security at nuclear weapons research facilities. Gerth quoted an unidentified U.S. official who suggested that the espionage issue was minimized by the White House because, "This conflicted with their China policy. It undercut the administration's efforts to have a strategic partnership with the Chinese." The White House has denied this. The Wall Street Journal notes that the administration's inaction "came in the thick of a 1996 re-election effort we now know included campaign contributions from those with ties to the Chinese government, its military and even its intelligence organizations." Even as the breakdown of security was being investigated by the FBI, Bill Clinton was entertaining Wang Jun, an arms dealer for the Chinese People's Liberation Army, at the White House, and Al Gore was soliciting campaign contributions from impoverished Buddhist nuns, whose political largess is second only to that of impecunious Indonesian gardeners. Not that the nuns realized much benefit from it -- the big favors went to fat cat Clinton contributor Bernard L. Schwartz, the chairman of the Loral Space & Communications Ltd., that was granted a Presidential waiver allowing the company to export to China space technology which also has military applications. This, despite the fact that Loral was the target of a criminal investigation by the Justice Department at the time for -- you guessed it -- illegally transferring critical technology to China. GREEN GROWS THE LORAL To understand the plot line of this Chinese opera, we must go back a year or so to the Chinagate story by Jeff Gerth that broke in the New York Times. The story related how Democratic fund- raiser Johnny Chung admitted to Justice Department investigators that he had given the Democrats nearly $100,000 that came from the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The money had been passed to him by Lt. Col. Liu Chao-ying of the PLA, whose father, General Liu Huaqing, was, at the time, the top military leader in China and a leading figure in the Chinese Communist Party. Chung told investigators that $80,000 of the money went directly to the Democratic National Committee. He also said that Col. Liu, an executive in the Chinese aerospace industry, revealed the source of the money to him. The White House counsel's spokesman, Jim Kennedy, told the press at the time: "We had no knowledge about the source of Chung's money or the background of his guest. In hindsight it was clearly not appropriate for Chung to bring her to see the President." He was apparently referring to a fund-raiser to which Chung had brought Col. Liu. where both had been photographed with President Clinton. Although both Clinton and Gore had repeatedly attended fund-raisers at which well-heeled foreign investors had been present, they continued to maintain that they knew nothing about illegal foreign campaign contributions. Gerth, in his article last year, said that Chung's account of the alleged events is backed by "supporting documents", including bank records. Deborah Orin reported in the New York Post last May that "Chinese officials have confirmed that a top general's spy- trained daughter funneled illegal campaign cash to the Democratic National Committee." President Clinton's decision to make it easier for American commercial communication satellites to be launched on Chinese boosters was an important issue for Col. Liu's company which, in addition to building missiles for the Chinese military, is in the commercial satellite business. It was also important to certain American companies, especially those in the communication satellite business. Companies such as such as Hughes, Loral, Motorola, and Martin-Marietta, that build satellites had been paying hundreds of millions of dollars to launch their products on U.S. boost vehicles. The cost of using a Chinese booster is just $25 to $85 million per launch, according to Washington Times science editor Bill Gertz. There was a problem, however. The Chinese boost vehicles were not reliable. On average only one launch in four could be expected to succeed. In an effort to improve the reliability of Chinese launch vehicles the American companies were prepared to share "some of America's most sensitive missile technology," Gertz wrote in National Review last year. They conducted a series of discussions with the Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology on such arcane technical subjects as the adequacy of the "altitude- control [sic] system on the Long March launcher." (Gertz was probably referring to the attitude-control system). Also mentioned in the Gertz article were "test firings of a kick motor for the booster's last stage." (The "kick stage" imparts the final velocity vector to the payload and must meet rigorous accuracy requirements). Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the deal is described as follows by Gertz: "U.S. companies were also involved in giving China the same technology used to launch MIRVs (multiple, independently targeted re-entry vehicles), hydra-warheads that vastly increase the firepower of nuclear missiles." Thus it would seem that although the Clinton administration was aware that the Chinese had stolen information from the U.S. that is critical to the development of MIRVed warheads, they then proceeded to allow the technology used to launch MIRVed warheads to be transferred as well. Apparently the American people are too apathetic and ill-informed to understand what is being done to them, and hardly anyone in the mainstream media (besides Gerth, Gertz and a few others) is interested in telling them. When Marx predicted that capitalists would sell the Commies the rope with which to hang them, he obviously didn't know the half of it. When a Chinese Long March booster launched at a facility in Southern China exploded in February of 1996, destroying a $200 million American satellite owned by Hughes Electronics Corp. and Loral Space & Communications Ltd., the two companies analyzed the failure and came up with a number of recommendations on how to avoid such mishaps in future launches. These were presented in a detailed report which pinpointed the cause of the failure as a defect in the booster's guidance system. Since the Long March rocket is also used to deliver nuclear warheads, the technology transferred in this instance has military value, but the two companies did not bother to check it out with the State Department to determine whether it is legal to share such information with the Chinese, whom many in Washington see as a potential future adversary. After mulling the matter over for several months, the two companies reported to the State Department what they had done. This triggered a Pentagon investigation which concluded that "United States national security has been harmed." Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R., Calif.), Chairman of the House Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, said of the incident: "It seems what happened was a sterile, coldly calculated decision to fix these problems with no consideration of the national-security implications to the United States." The congressman objected to American companies improving the performance of Chinese strategic missiles that may one day be launched at American cities. The New York Times reported last Monday that China presently has "roughly 20 nuclear missiles that can reach American shores, and perhaps 300 nuclear weapons that, aboard medium-range missiles or bombers, could hit Japan, India or Russia." The Chinese D-5 long-range missile has the capability to hit virtually any target in the United States. The number presently deployed is estimated at five to seven. An additional dozen or so D-4 missiles, capable of hitting targets on the West Coast are also thought to be deployed. David Sanger and Erik Eckholm wrote in the Times article: "The revelation that China appears to have stolen the design of America's most advanced miniaturized warhead has prompted new debate in Washington over whether China's small nuclear force could become a far more potent arsenal that could rekindle the kind of fears that shaped the cold war." If, at some future date, we get blasted out of our snug, comfy fantasy world by Chinese MIRVs, we will at least have the satisfaction of knowing that we have contributed to the greening of Loral -- lavishing upon them the long green, that is. And here I thought that 60s boomer brat hippies such as Clinton were supposed to loath the "Military-Industrial Complex." I guess it's just the military they loath. For a slick political opportunist, unencumbered by an excess of scruples, the MIC can be the ultimate cash-cow. As those hippie entrepreneurs of the 60s used to say, "Climb on, cash in and cop out." THE LOS ALAMOS SPY STORY In his March 6 article this year, Gerth mentions that while Clinton was preparing to meet with Chinese President Jiang Zemin in 1997, he asked for an assessment from the CIA and was told that the Chinese had indeed stolen secret information on nuclear warheads from the Los Alamos laboratory, although they did not fully concur with the Energy Department's assessment of the seriousness of the situation. The CIA cited other possible reasons than espionage for China's rapid progress in weapons development, including "Chinese ingenuity." However, the CIA's chief counterspy, Paul Redmond, is said by Gerth to have been "stunned" by the revelations, and recalled saying, "This is going to be just as bad as the Rosenbergs," referring to Soviet spies Julius and Ethel Rosenberg who stole nuclear secrets from Los Alamos for the Russians during the 1940s. They were both executed for their traitorous acts which enabled the Soviets to develop the atomic bomb (as it was called then) years ahead of the date anticipated by U.S. experts. Results of Chinese nuclear weapons tests were closely examined by experts at Los Alamos in 1995. They found similarities between the Chinese weapons and the latest U.S. nuclear weapons designs that seemed to confirm Redmond's worst fears. There was an unmistakable similarity between the Chinese test warheads and the latest U.S. MIRVed warhead configuration, the W-88. Trulock divulged this information to the FBI late that year. By February of the following year the security team at Los Alamos had identified five possible suspects. One in particular, Wen Ho Lee, a computer scientist who worked in the nuclear weapons area at Los Alamos, came in for close scrutiny. The wife of this suspect had been invited in 1985 to address a Chinese conference that dealt with highly technical data processing subjects although she lacked the technical expertise to understand the material. She was accompanied by her husband, who was the actual expert. In April of 1996 Trulock and senior officials of the Energy Department briefed Clinton's deputy national security adviser, Sandy Berger, on China's acquisition of the W-88 design and informed him that a Chinese spy might still be operating at Los Alamos. Berger, who is now the national security adviser, confirmed this. A criminal investigation initiated by the FBI that summer made little progress. Redmond, then the CIA counterspy chief, said that his agency was not kept up to date on the case. Gertz cited officials who claim that after Frederico Pena assumed the position of energy secretary at the beginning of 1997 the counterintelligence program which had been approved as part of the plan to tighten security was quietly deemphasized for over a year. The Energy Department ignored recommendations by the FBI for tightening security for 17 months. No explanation has been given for the holdup. Jeff Gerth wrote in the New York Times last week that the Deputy Secretary of Energy, Charles B. Curtis, had ordered that a regimen of tightened security measures be imposed on the weapons labs in November 1996, to be stepped up over a period of several months. But the plan was never implemented, according to government sources, despite a blunt warning in the department's 1996 security review that DOE was "at greater risk of becoming a victim of espionage than at any time in its history." Pena told the Times in a telephone interview last week, "The first time I heard about this plan was two days ago. What happened here?" adding, "this is a serious issue that should not have fallen through the cracks." Uh, yeah, you might say. White House spokesman Joe Lockhart added to the "mystery", telling reporters that nobody knew from nuthin' at their end about a program of tightened security measures in 1996. Right then -- the security measures canceled themselves without telling anyone. Happens all the time. This stumbling, bumbling, fumbling selective amnesia act -- "I don't remember; I know nothing, nothing; Was heisst 'security measures?'" -- is growing a bit long in the tooth. Who but an "average" Gallup Poll respondent would believe such twaddle at this point? (Gallup's latest survey on foreign policy underscores the low comedy of public opinion polling in America. Clinton was rated No. 1 among post war presidents in foreign policy, although the AP article I read failed to say by what percentage. Among respondents asked to name the most important foreign policy issue, "I don't know" led with 21 percent -- Duuhh. One of Clinton's strong points was thought to be -- get this -- national defense). Gerth notes that "other Administration officials" feared that "too much security" might impede Clinton's plan "to use weapons labs to deepen ties with countries like China by encouraging scientific visits aimed at improving nuclear safety." Oh? WHOSE nuclear safety? Early that year new evidence had turned up that the Chinese were running other espionage operations at Los Alamos and other locations. When Trulock requested an appointment with Pena to report this, he was put off for four months. Pena later said that he did not know why Trulock had to wait so long for an appointment, but volunteered that he had "brought some very important issues to my attention and that's what we need in the government." Berger was briefed by Energy Department officials in July of 1997 on the seriousness of the Chinese penetration of U.S. weapons development programs and he in turn briefed Clinton. When they became aware of Trulock's alarming information, CIA Director George Tenet and FBI Director Louis Freeh talked to Pena about the inadequate security at the weapons' labs. The Energy Secretary professed to be shocked and says that he "went to work on shifting the balance in favor of security." The evidence against the primary suspect continued to mount. Security agents learned that he had made a trip to Hong Kong without informing the proper authorities and while there had received $700 from American Express, which they suspect was used to pay for an airline ticket to Shanghai. All of this came to the attention of the FBI at the time Congress was looking into allegations that agents of the Chinese government had made illegal campaign contributions to the Democratic Party during the 1996 presidential campaign. In August of 1997 the NSC asked for an assessment of the damage caused by espionage at Los Alamos. The DOE and CIA agreed that critical technical information had been compromised to the benefit of China, but differed on the extent of the damage. The CIA thought that the Chinese might have obtained information used in their weapons development program from "a variety of sources" including the Russians. Trulock contested this, saying that the Russians had assisted the Chinese in the evaluation of their nuclear tests, but had not provided them design information. Gertz quoted an official as saying that "At the meeting, Notra Trulock said that he thought the CIA was underplaying the effect that successful Chinese espionage operations in the weapons labs had had on the Chinese nuclear weapons program." Nevertheless the NSC accepted the CIA assessment without even waiting to hear Trulock's rebuttal. However, the CIA has vehemently denied that they had intended to minimize the results of Trulock's investigative efforts. By fall of that year the FBI decided that they did not have sufficient evidence to make a case against their primary suspect. They informed DOE that there was no longer any reason to keep the suspect in his sensitive position lest he be tipped off that he was under investigation. Despite the FBI advisory, the subject was allowed to keep his Top Secret security clearance and his position for more than a year after that. When the House Intelligence Committee asked to be brought up to date on the security at Los Alamos in July of 1998, Elizabeth Moler, who was the acting energy secretary at that time, ordered Trulock not to brief them on the espionage matter lest the details of the case be used to undermine Clinton's China policy. He was told to limit his testimony to the topic on the committee's agenda, allowing foreign visitors into the labs. Some members of Congress began to learn of the seriousness of the security breach later that year when Trulock testified before a select committee, chaired by Rep. Christopher Cox (R-CA), which was looking into the transfer of sensitive technology. They began to complain that the administration had not kept them adequately informed on the spy case. Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) accused President Clinton of withholding information and covering up "the Chinese theft of our technology." Noting Clinton's previous history of deception, Inhofe said in a Senate speech: "So I'm sure there is a paper trail that he can allege. The way the President probably covered himself was to include tidbits about this theft buried in briefings on 40 or 50 others items, so the significance of it would not be noticed. But a paper trail would be established." Shortly after information about the spy case came to light, Inhofe talked to Rep. Porter Goss, the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, and Sen. Arlen Specter, the Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who informed him that, "Neither chairman was notified of the W-88 nuclear warhead technology theft." Noting that the two chairmen would have been the first to be notified, Inhofe concluded that "President Clinton engaged in a cover up scheme." Rep. Norman Dicks, (D-WA), the ranking minority member on the House Intelligence Committee who also sat on the Cox committee, said, "Porter Goss and I were not properly briefed about the dimensions of the problem. It was compartmentalized and disseminated over the years in dribs and drabs so that the full extent of the problem was not known until the Cox committee." By the end of the year, Dicks had lost patience with DOE's stiff arming and told the new Energy Secretary, Bill Richardson, that he must act to restore adequate security at the weapons labs. The suspect was given polygraph tests late that year and again in February and was thought to be lying. The FBI stepped up its investigation; meanwhile the Cox Committee finished a secret, 700-page report which concluded that Chinese espionage had damaged U.S. security by saving the Chinese large amounts of time and money in developing nuclear warheads that could be used against the United States. The bipartisan panel unanimously supported Trulock's assessment of the spy case. However, by this time Trulock had been demoted from being head of the DOE intelligence office to the position of acting deputy. (Rule 1: When a government agency really messes up, the invariable remedy is to whack the whistleblower). Energy Secretary Richardson and his henchmen have hypocritically praised Trulock's performance while sanctimoniously denying that he has been mistreated. Of course -- what better way to reward a subordinate for a job well done than to make him even more subordinate? (Rule 2: When the situation is obvious, deny it). Redmond, who has since retired as chief of the CIA's counterintelligence, won his spurs by catching a Russian deep cover agent within his own agency, Aldrich Ames. The former CIA counterspy said that the spy at Los Alamos did even more damage to national security than Ames. THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS On NBC's "Meet the Press" a week ago, Tim Russert laid out for Clinton's national security adviser, Sandy Berger, the outline of the case against the administration as columnist William Safire recently framed it: "(a) the Clinton-Gore fund-raising from admittedly illegal Asian sources, followed by our stunning turnabout in trade policy; (b) the uncleared access to the White House by a high Chinese military intelligence official; (c) the Clinton decision, accompanied by huge campaign contributions by a satellite manufacturer, to switch regulation of technology transfer to his anything-goes Commerce Department, and (d) the years of foot-dragging by the Clinton National Security Council when confronted by evidence that China had stolen nuclear secrets from Los Alamos." Is there a pattern here, or what? Berger thought not. "Absolutely no truth to it -- it's an outrageous statement," snapped the first national security adviser to immerse himself in presidential politics, attending campaign meetings at the White House on a regular basis. Is Mr. Berger telling us that the points made by Safire are not factual, or would he have us believe that they are not related? As to the factual content of the first charge, the Democratic National Committee has acknowledged its validity by saying that they would return the contributions -- although they have yet to do so. Sen. Inhofe makes the point that: "President Clinton hosted over 100 White House fundraisers as part of a larger aggressive scheme to raise campaign contributions, many from illegal foreign sources, primarily including sources in China. Among guests permitted to attend these White House fundraisers were a convicted felon and a Chinese arms dealer." The fund-raisers included some with strong ties to China, such as John Huang, Charlie Trie, Johnny Chung, and James Riady. All of them acted with Clinton's knowledge. While it is not entirely clear to whom Safire refers in the second point, he presumably meant Lt. Col. Liu Chao-ying of the People's Liberation Army who was photographed with Clinton in the White House. Safire refers to Liu in his column as a possible link between the theft of weapons secrets and the purchase of secrets from U.S. manufacturers of computers and satellites. Neither is there any question that Clinton shifted the primary satellite export regulation function from the State Department to the Commerce Department, at a time when he was getting lavish campaign contributions from the chairman of Loral, a satellite manufacturer. Clinton also signed export control waivers that allowed Loral to transfer sensitive U.S. missile guidance technology to China. This clearly made it easier for the Chinese to improve the reliability and accuracy of their launch vehicles (and ballistic missiles). Berger may deny that there was any connection between Clinton's decisions and the contributions, but that hardly settles the matter given this administration's track record for mendacity. As to the administration's foot-dragging with regard to Chinese espionage at Los Alamos, the evidence is overwhelming. The ranking Republican and Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee agree that they were not properly informed about this, as do all of the members of the committee. As Rep. Dicks said, "It was compartmentalized and disseminated over the years in dribs and drabs so that the full extent of the problem was not known until the Cox committee." And yet the national security adviser has the brass to appear on nationwide TV and deny the obvious. This is in keeping with the well established standards of the Clinton administration. Their personal integrity has been running on empty from the beginning. While all of this was happening the president was making statements to the American people such as the following: "For the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age, there is not a single solitary nuclear missile pointed at an American child tonight. Not one. Not a single one." At the time Clinton made this statement he was well aware that China had targeted as many as 18 American cities with nuclear missiles. How does he get away with it? The main fault lies with the American public who are notoriously apathetic and ill informed about such matters as public affairs and national defense. Also, a great many Americans are apparently naive enough to suppose that a psychopath who lies blatantly to his closest advisers, his wife, his daughter, the public, and a grand jury while under oath, would never lie to them about anything important. Why not? Well, he said so, didn't he? How do Asians see all of this? Has Chinagate affected the way they view this country? Columnist Peter Zhang, writing in the New Australian, points out that although Americans either do not understand what their president is up to, or pretend not to understand, the same is not true "in China's intellectual and political circles." He mentions that he had already written nine months ago, "Clinton is contemptuously referred to as 'nanren men zai hua sheng dun' (our man in Washington)," by a number of knowledgeable Chinese government and military officials. Zhang says that our president is also held in very low regard by the Chinese people, and this has lessened their esteem for the U.S. Clinton's weakness and vacillation have done much to strengthen the hand of China's military nationalists, undercutting those in the government and elsewhere who would like to have a more normal relationship with the West. Assuming that "unlike Truman, Eisenhower or Reagan, Clinton lacks the courage to act," the militarists have been emboldened to attempt acts of adventurism, such as virtual annexation of the Spratley Islands. Such things do not go unnoticed by other Asian governments, who regard the American president as a nonentity. At the beginning of last month, Zhang wrote that among clued-in Chinese, "There is no doubt that Clinton allowed military technology to be sold to the PLA for campaign funds." With regard to claims by Democrats that "sensitive technology transfers" took place during the Reagan administration, Zhang makes the point that information was stolen by the Chinese during this time, but was not transferred with the assent of the U.S. government, adding: "Under Clinton, however, the situation radically changed. Instead of having to steal technology, as they did under Reagan, they simply bribed Clinton into transferring it to them." Zhang says that the technology transfer did not have to be conducted this time through the Central External Liaison Department or the Central Control of Intelligence, but was arranged by PLA officers and intelligence operatives who walked right into the White House. Much of the technology was provided by American corporations that "directly assisted Beijing to upgrade its weapons systems -- for a price." He mentions in this regard, "The likes of William Hambrecht and Bernard Schwartz, well-known heavy contributors to the Democratic Party, have also benefited handsomely from arrangements with the PLA, as have a great many other big shot executives who seem to prefer the colour green to red, white and blue." So what is anybody going to do about it? Well, the Senate began holding hearings last week on the espionage at the Los Alamos weapons lab, and the CIA has picked a retired admiral to review its review of the damage done to national security by the spy, who apparently is going to walk. He has not been charged and the FBI is said to doubt that they have any chance to make a case against him. In other words, don't hold your breath. After some interminable period of time the admiral will no doubt write a report saying that this or that could be improved and administering a ritual flogging with a damp noodle to a few low ranking scapegoats. As for the Senate hearing, don't keep me in suspense. Congress always does such a terrific job of investigating government malfeasance -- Waco, Vince Foster, illegal campaign contributions, to name but a few. Wake me up when they issue the report. Former Energy Secretary Richardson testified last Tuesday, defending his department's performance in the Los Alamos espionage case. "I believe we have successfully addressed this problem," Richardson told the Senate Armed Services Committee. "I believe we have strong security procedures in place." Rule 3: It doesn't matter what you say if enough people are ignorant of the facts, so you may as well paint as rosy a picture as possible. In another development, the Majority Whip, Tom Delay, revealed last week that the House is expected to vote on releasing the report of the Cox committee in another week or so, saying, "We will have to have a vote of the House in order to declassify that report, and when the American people see what's in it, I think they will be really outraged." What could possibly be in the report that would be likely to outrage an audience as jaded as the American people? Reporter Chris Ruddy may have provided an answer to this question in an article that appeared last Friday in the Pittsburgh Tribune- Review. According to Ruddy, a nuclear weapons scientist has alleged, under condition of anonymity, that the Clinton administration "aggressively sought to provide" China with extremely sensitive nuclear weapons technology. Specifically, the scientist charged that the administration "facilitated the transfer" of laser technology used to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The scientist said that, "This was the highest funded project and the most secret project the government had. So secret, in fact, a special security compound known as the 'super block' was created within the processing area, simply known as Building 332." This technology would allow countries such as Iran and Iraq to master the difficulties encountered in producing weapons grade plutonium. Perhaps more significantly, it would enable countries such as China, that already possess nuclear weapons, to amass a large stockpile of such weapons quickly and at relatively low cost. The scientist alleged that a deal to transfer this technology was struck with the Chinese after a meeting at the Lawrence Livermore laboratories chaired by then Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary in 1994. He said the deal was consummated later that year in a meeting between top officials of the Energy and Commerce Departments and representatives of the Chinese government. O'Leary has declined to comment on the story. Officials at the Lawrence Livermore laboratory have expressed doubt about the validity of the scientist's claims. It seems inconceivable that any administration would transfer such sensitive information to a potential adversary, but the track record of this administration in reversing previous policy with regard to the transfer of weapons- related technology leaves much room for skepticism. Stories of alleged spying have begun to emerge from other weapons labs, including a report by the Associated Press that sensitive neutron bomb and electromagnetic pulse technology may have been passed to China as the result of espionage at the Argonne National Laboratory. Counterintelligence sources cited in the AP story were highly skeptical of the allegations. Some observers suspect that stories such as these are being planted by the Clinton administration to undermine the credibility of the Los Alamos spy scandal and inoculate the public against further revelations by the Cox committee. Amidst all the shouting, the Clinton administration have made it known that they are prepared to consider a limited missile defense system for the country, just to weed out the odd stray shot from a "rogue nation." (Presumably the missiles of more gentlemanly adversaries will be waved through to the targets -- we want to be sporting about it, after all). So, at long last "Doc" Clinton and his highly trained staff of certifiable quacks have deduced the true nature of our problem: too much dependence on national security and an irrational craving for an adequate missile defense. They have prescribed a 12-step program to wean us away from our addiction. The intelligence needed to survive on this planet is not inordinate, but at this point we seem to be weighing in at well below the minimum requirement. Edward Zehr can be reached at ezehr@capaccess.org Published in the Mar. 22, 1999 issue of The Washington Weekly Copyright 1999 The Washington Weekly (http://www.federal.com) Reposting permitted with this message intact