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Berryville Wagon Raid
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August 13, 1864
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This report by Lieutenant Colonel Frederick R. Miller does not appear in the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (O.R.) but was published in the September 2, 1864 edition of the Wyandot Pioneer. It appears for the first time on this website and in the regimental history. The Berryville Wagon Raid was an unmitigated disaster for Sheridan's army, especially so for the 144th Ohio. Losses totaled 5 killed, 10 wounded, and 76 captured. This totaled more than a third of the regiment's strength at that time. Captain Henry H. Ragon of Company A reported on August 6, 1864 in a letter home that the regiment numbered 340 officers and men out of 830. The vast majority of those not with the regiment were scattered in hospitals from Washington to Annapolis to Baltimore and beyond. It is impossible to get an accurate count of how many men were actually on the field at Berryville as the regimental books were put to the torch during the raid. A more detailed (and balanced) analysis along with a complete casualty listing is included in the CDROM history.
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Headquarters, 144th Regiment O.N.G
Bolivar Heights
Aug. 17th, 1864
W.M. Ambrose, Capt. & A.A.A. Gen.
Sir- I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the 144th Regiment, O.N.G. in guarding the wagon train from Halltown to Winchester, and in the action with Mosby’s guerillas, near Berryville, Va., Saturday Aug. 13th, 1864.
Pursuant to instructions from Brigade Headquarters, the 144th O.N.G. was ordered to guard the rear of the train, with two companies in the extreme rear and counting from the rear to place one Co. between 20 wagons. Brig. Gen. Kenly’s Brigade was to bring up the rear of the train. The wagons of several corps arriving indiscriminately, it was very difficult to ascertain what was the rear of the train, but when the brigade teams began to move, we fell in their rear. When we had marched but a very few miles, I met Col. Brown of the 149th O.N.G. who informed me that he had not got through distributing the companies yet, as per order, and that the Cavalry train had not passed. I informed Gen. Kenly of this fact by Col. Brown. I halted my command to await the cavalry train, which finally made its appearance, waiting for 120 to 140 wagons to pass, I was informed by the officer in charge that was the rear of the Cavalry train and accordingly fell in and ordered my Adjutant to distribute the companies among the wagons as per order, and I found them distributed exactly in the manner ordered, this brought it nearly dark before arriving at Charlestown.
It was extremely difficult to regulate the movement of the train, the rear being late in starting, hurried to catch up with the advance, consequently forcing my men to speed up in pace entirely, some riding along on horseback and on wagons.
Three miles north of Berryville, I was detained for some time by the breaking of a bridge. Moving on within ½ mile of Berryville, I was surprised to see the train had been ordered parked by the Major, this I thought a very strange proceeding. In, in coming up to the place, mentioned the dangerous position we were in, in case of attack. Soon, after meeting Captain Mann, with his assistance made every effort to move the train, in which we finally succeeded. Capt. Mann rendered valuable service and did all in his power to move the train after finding it parked. While the train was getting ready to be moved, the train of another Cavalry Brigade came up guarded by some cavalry and drove past without halting, thereby escaping the affray. This was the first information I had of another train being in our rear. At four o’clock A.M., the train was under way with the exception of from 30 to 40 wagons which were getting ready to move. I had distributed the companies of my command in the following order: Co. C S.J. Lamb in the advance followed by Capt. Brayton Co.D, next was Capt. Ragon Co.A, J.S. Leith Co.H, intending to bring up the rear with companies B and K. I had sent Adjutant Ayres in advance to see the proper distribution of companies among the wagons at this time and before the rear of the train got under way, a simultaneous attack was made upon the front, center, and rear part of this train (at and between Berryville and the extreme rear) by about 200 of Mosby’s cavalry with two light pieces of artillery. Meeting with Capt. Mann at this time I ordered to regulate and hurry on the wagons and carry the news to the front of the train as fast as possible. The companies did try successfully to check the attacking Rebels. The companies under Capts. Ragon and Brayton forming lines with Cos. C and H. and with Adjutant Ayres finally drove the Rebels through and out of town.
The companies in the rear of my immediate command (drinking their coffee while waiting for the train to move) were cut off at once from the balance of the command, were overpowered and after making all resistance possible, were compelled to yield to superior numbers Many were made prisoners and others made their escape, some of whom joined other companies. The officers and men, considering their exhausted condition in which they were, did nobly, thereby saving much property, especial credit is due to Capt. Ragon, of Co.A, and Capt. Brayton of Co.D, together with the officers and men of Cos. C and H for coolness and bravery.
My command left Halltown with about three hundred men but the severity of the march made many fall out during the night. I don’t think we had more than 280 men, all told, in the action. Our casualties are heavy considering the numbers engaged, 5 killed, 6 wounded, and 60 prisoners and missing. Capt. Black, Lt. Sage, and Lt. S.H. White are supposed to be taken prisoners. Several are coming in, however, and it is to be hoped the list of missing will be greatly diminished.
The disaster in my opinion is due to some extent on the tardiness of the train of the Cavalry Corps in moving from Bolivar, the detention at the breaking of the bridge three miles north of Berryville, and finally the parking of the train near Berryville. But for these causes the train could have been moved with more regularity and would have been miles beyond that place before daylight of the 13th. The scattering cavalry did not render the slightest assistance, if anything they added with the frightened teamsters and wagon masters, to the confusion and panic.
Very respectfully your obedient servant,
F.R. Miller
Lieut. Col. Commanding
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