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Battle of Monocacy
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This report by Colonel Allison L. Brown gives a good account of what the Companies B, G, and I went through during the Battle of Monocacy. From all of the research I've done, I believe that these three companies mustered no more than 200 men that day, probably closer to 180. Casualties numbered 4 killed, 15 wounded, and 28 captured. For a more detailed account and analysis of this battle, please purchase a copy of my CDROM regimental history.
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Numbers 18. Report of Colonel Allison L. Brown, One hundred and forty-ninth Ohio Infantry, of battle of the Monocacy.
HDQRS. 149TH REGIMENT OHIO NATIONAL GUARD,
Baltimore, Md., July 14, 1864.
COLONEL: I have the honor to report to you the part taken by my regiment in the action of the 9th instant at Monocacy Junction, Md.:
In pursuance of orders from brigade headquarters, Third Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps, under date of July 3, 1864, I reported that part of my regiment that remained under my command, consisting of Companies B, E, I, and K, to Brigadier-General Tyler at Monocacy Junction, at 3.30 p. m. July 7, 1864. I here found Companies C, D, and G of my regiment, which had been on duty at Annapolis, Md., and Companies B, I, and G of the One hundred and forty-fourth Regiment Ohio National Guard were, by order of Major-General Wallace, commanding, attached to my command, amounting in aggregate strength to 660 men. One the evening of that day, by order of Brigadier-General Tyler, my command was sent forward to take post at Frederick, which it did at daylight on Friday morning, 8th. I remained in position at Frederick during the day; threw out skirmishers to watch the enemy, who were in force in my front a considerable portion of the time.
At 4 p. m. on the 8th instant received orders from the general commanding to withdraw my men and fall back on the Baltimore pike toward Monocacy bridge, which I did. Before arriving at the bridge I was ordered by Brigadier-General Tyler to assume command of the Eleventh Regiment Maryland Volunteers and my own regiment, to move my command across the river to Monocacy and take position at that point. Soon after I had taken posts at this point, an order came from Major-General Wallace to the colonel commanding the Eleventh Maryland Volunteers to take his regiment and the detachment of the One hundred and forty-fourth Ohio National Guard under my command and report to General Tyler at Monocacy Junction without delay, leaving me the seven companies of my own regiment with which to hold the position. I posted my command in such a manner as in my judgment to most effectually hold the bridge and guard against a surprise, either in front or on my flank. From information gained from sources I considered reliable, I had reason to think the enemy would attempt to cross the river at a ford about one mile above the Monocacy bridge. I therefore posted one of my companies at that point with orders to hold it at all hazards. There was no alarm on my lines during the night.
At daylight on the 9th I caused my skirmish line to be deployed on the crest of the ridge on the Frederick side of the river, and made every preparation in my power to hold the position as ordered. The enemy made his appearance at 6 a.m. and threw out his skirmishers, who soon became engaged with my men. About 10 a. m. I discovered from a point overlooking the field the rebel cavalry making disposition to turn my right and cross the river at the ford before alluded to. I sent company E, Captain Jenkins, to re-enforce Captain McGinnis, who held the ford; also a company of mounted infantry, commanded by Captain Leib, U. S. Army. The enemy were handsomely repulsed in the attempt to cross the river at the upper ford, and withdrew his forces, leaving only a light skirmish line. I now discovered that an effort was being made to attack my left in force. I sent immediately for re-enforcements. Companies B, I, and G, One hundred and forty-fourth Ohio National Guard, were sent to my relief. I had sent five men of the mounted infantry force to my left, to watch the movements of the enemy and report immediately should he make any demonstration in that quarter. These men I heard nothing of until some hours afterward, having been fired on and retreated, leaving me without information as to the effort that was making against my left. As it was extremely uncertain at what particular point he would make the demonstration, I was compelled to keep three companies in reserve at the bridge in order to be prepared to meet him at any point he might choose. About 11.30 a. m. the attack came; a heavy force of infantry had been deployed on the extension of my line of skirmishers and marched by the flank to within range of my extreme left. All this had been done under cover of the ground, which at that point was very favorable to the enemy for that purpose. The superiority of his numbers enabled him to push back my left and take position so as to enfilade my line. In order to dislodge the enemy from this position and restore my line it was necessary to have recourse to the bayonet, which in this instance proved very effective. I ordered Company B, One hundred and forty-ninth, to charge the enemy's position, which it did, but was repulsed. I then took Companies B, I, and G, One hundred and forty-fourth, re-enforced, drove the rebels from their position and re-established my lines. During this charge my loss was quite severe, owing to the fact that the enemy was posted behind the fence, while my men were compelled to charge across an open field, up the hill in fair view, and within short range of his guns. We took 2 prisoners, and the enemy left 2 dead on the field. I now extended my line so as to command this position, which I held throughout the day, until my force was withdrawn. Between 4 and 5 p. m. I received an order from Major-General Wallace to hold the bridge over the Monocacy at that point to the last extremity, and when I was pressed to hard that nothing more could be done, to command my men to disperse and to take care of themselves. At this time the firing had ceased at the Monocacy Junction, and being satisfied that the enemy would make a desperate effort to obtain possession of the bridge, and thus cut off my retreat as well a gain the rear of the army, I made such disposition of the forces under my command as I thought would enable me to hold out as long as possible. I contracted my skirmish line, thus strengthening me center, and covered all the commanding points I could with my forces. I ordered the officer in command of the cavalry to take such position with his men as would protect my left flank on the east side of the river and prevent the enemy from getting possession of my rear. Immediately after this, and about 6 p. m., a heavy attack was made along my entire front, and at the same time my left flank was turned. I now discovered that the enemy had gained a position in the woods, on the east side of the river in my rear, and was preparing to take possession of the brigade, thus cutting off my retreat entirely. My command in front was withdrawn in confusion, owing to the extent of my lines and the knowledge that the enemy had gained possession of the woods in the rear and was attempting to cut off retreat. I attempted to rally my men, who were well deposed to obey orders under the circumstances, when the enemy brought his artillery to bear on the bridge and threw several shells, one of which struck it while my men were crossing it I rallied a portion of the men in the orchard overlooking the bridge, and fired several rounds at the enemy, who were pressing from the west side, and also those in the woods and wheat-field south of my position. This checked the pursuit, and enabled the main part of the command to gain the road on the hill. The enemy now opened fire on my flank from his skirmishers on the east side of the river, which added to the confusion. This fire was returned by a portion of the men stationed in the orchard, and the enemy's progress was checked. The men now learned from citizens that the main body of the army had moved out some two hours before, and this, with the increasing fire of the enemy on my flank, produced considerable confusion, during which the men broke and threw away their guns and accouterments and attempted to save themselves. This information received and that they were surrounded and would be made prisoners, caused them to break their guns to prevent them falling into the enemy's hands. I succeeded, however, in bringing off about 300 of my command, with which I joined the main body at New Market about 8 p. m.
I fell justly proud of the manner in which the men conducted themselves during this first engagement, holding, as they did, an extended skirmish line for twelve hours in the face of vastly superior numbers of experienced troops. They exhibited a coolness and determination which gives promise of great usefulness in the service of the country.
I am unable to give the losses sustained by my command, on account of my surgeon being captured. Many of the missing will doubtless rejoin the regiment, and a greater portion of the wounds received are but slight. Up to the time of retreat I had 6 killed and 14 severely wounded, besides a number slightly wounded.
As to the conduct of the officers-field, and line-on that day, where so many did well, it is invidious to particularize. I cannot, however, close my report without referring to a few whose duties required them to expose themselves to more danger than others. Major Ebenezer Rozelle, who had command of the left wing for several hours, deserves particular mention. The aid rendered by my adjutant, T. Q. Hildebrant, in conveying my orders and cheering and encouraging the men, deserves grateful mention. He did his duty well. I regret to say that Surgeon W. A. Brown, who throughout the entire day was at his post, attending promptly to the wounded, was left behind on the retreat and became a prisoner. He nobly refused to abandon his wounded, and thus displayed a heroism worthy of emulation.
I have the honor to be, colonel, your obedient servant,
A. L. BROWN,
Colonel, Commanding 149th Regiment Ohio National Guard.
Lieutenant Colonel SAMUEL B. LAWRENCE,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Eighth Army Corps
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