Moore's after action report Nov 14, 1965 LZ X-Ray
More Joe L. Galloway's lies. Dickie Chappelle
How well did Galloway know Chappelle?
Joe L. Galloway "Chapelle was my friend, mentor"?
Dickie Chappelle on Joe L. Galloway, cocky 23 year old, was surprise when Chappelle said she didn't want
to be fussed over in the field, becouse she was a woman.
Joe L. Galloway on Chappelle, "she was too old 50ish."
"who would be responsible for her, when she was in the field?"
"who was going to carry her gear in the field?"
time spent together , 2 hours, with others present.
Joe L. Galloway "describes" how Chappelle died! when he wasent there.
There was Dickie Chapelle, with her horn-rimmed glasses and a boonie hat decorated with the jump wings
she'd earned in some other war long before.
She told me that the first rule of war corresponding was that you must survive in order to write the story and
ship your film.
++A Marine walking in front of her set off a booby-trapped mortar shell and a tiny fragment nicked her carotid
artery.
THE BIG LIE
She bled to death, <true
++( her head in the lap of another reporter, )< False
++( Bob Poos, ) < false wasent there
while a Catholic chaplain gave her the last rites. <true
http://digitaljournalist.org/issue0204/galloway2.htm
My competition in those early days were guys like John Wheeler and Eddie Adams and Bob Poos of AP.
Simon Dring of Reuters.
Others who arrived in due course: UPI photographers Kyoichi Sawada and Steve Northup.
Dickie Chapelle. <( Joe Galloway my friend )
http://www.caller2.com/newsarch/news11571.html
Joe Galloway
( ``A mentor of mine, Dickey Chapelle, ) who had covered World War II, once told me you can have the best
story in the world, but you have to get out and live to file it,''
Galloway said.``War is a great story. There is always room for you on the front page and in many ways it's a
simple story.
Front Page || Main Index || Corpus Christi News || Business || Texas || Sports || Entertainment || Selena
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thursday, Jun. 4, 1998
Refugio native awarded Bronze Star
Former UPI reporter tried to save a wounded soldier during the Vietnam War
By STEPHANIE L. JORDAN
Staff Writer
BAYSIDE -- For Refugio native Joe Galloway, reporting the Vietnam War meant getting away from press briefings, safe base camps and clean sheets. He saw the war as the grunts saw it, down in the dirt with the heat, death, blood, fear and valor.
And on Nov. 15, 1965, during the first large-scale battle between American troops and the North Vietnamese Army, Galloway stopped being a United Press International reporter and became a hero.
On May 1, 1998, Galloway -- now a senior writer for U.S. News and World Report -- was awarded a Bronze Star with a ``V'' device for valor for his actions during the battle. Galloway, who divides his time between homes in Bayside and Boston, is the first civilian to be given the award from the Army, said Maj. Gen. Joseph K. Kellogg, who presented him with the medal at Fort Bragg, N.C.
``At that time and that place he was a soldier,'' Kellogg said. ``He was a soldier in spirit, he was a soldier in actions and he was a soldier in deeds.''
Galloway was honored for trying to save a wounded soldier during one of the pivotal battles of the Vietnam War, a battle that left 234 Americans dead.
``I know that wasn't my job, but in those days everyone did what they could to survive and help everyone else make it out of there alive,'' Galloway said.
While with troops of the 7th Cavalry's 1st Battalion -- part of the First Cavalry Division -- fighting in the Central Highlands, Galloway was in the battalion command post when an American fighter mistakenly dropped napalm near the position.
Galloway, crouching down to avoid enemy fire, saw PFC Jimmy Nakayama and Spc.5 James Clark get caught by the flames. With the help of Sgt. George Nye, Galloway grabbed Nakayama's feet and carried him to safety.
Clark died and, two days later, so did Nakayama.
``When I grabbed his feet, his boots just fell off, and I remember my hands touching raw bones,'' Galloway said. ``We carried him away and he was screaming. I can still hear those screams.''
Harold G. Moore, then the 1st Battalion commander, didn't learn about Galloway's actions until the two collaborated on ``We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young,'' a best-selling book about the history of the battle published in 1992. Moore, who retired as a three-star general, put Galloway in for the award.
``There was grazing machine-gun fire going over our heads and he got up in that grazing fire and ran to that soldier to save him,'' Moore said. ``One of my medics got shot, but Joe kept going. When the battle was over . . . I never gave any thought to giving this award to a civilian.''
For the 17-year-old 1958 Refugio High graduate, just getting to the Ia Drang Valley was a battle.
Galloway, now 56, said he wasn't a great student in high school and was only interested in reading, writing and history. He attended Victoria Junior College for six weeks, but didn't like it because it was too much like high school.
``I was on my way to join the Army when my mom, God bless her, said `But what about your journalism?' '' Galloway said. ``We just so happened to be driving by the Victoria Advocate's office so I stopped in and asked if I could be a reporter.''
After 18 months at the Advocate, Galloway joined UPI. At age 19, he was named bureau chief of UPI's Topeka, Kan., bureau, the youngest bureau chief in the history of the wire service.
``I guess that's because I was a young man in a hurry,'' Galloway said.
During his three years in Topeka, from 1961 to 1964, Galloway began lobbying his bosses to send him to Tokyo, the UPI bureau that covered the growing war in Vietnam.
``I knew this was my generation's war,'' he said. ``Not to have gone would have been much harder to explain than going is.''
He was in Tokyo for six months before going to Vietnam to cover the Marines.
From his first days in-country, Galloway worked hard to get to a firsthand view of the war. Military leaders weren't always pleased to see him.
But his willingness to show up in the field, to live with the troops, won the respect of many soldiers.
One of his early converts was H. Norman Schwarzkopf, then a major, who went on to become a four-star general and command the multinational coalition force that won the Persian Gulf War in 1991. In Vietnam, Galloway hooked up with Schwarzkopf in August 1965 at the Du Co Special Forces camp. Schwarzkopf and his South Vietnamese troops had been under attack for two weeks, and Schwarzkopf had just found out the unit would have to walk out of the area.
Galloway showed up and asked to march out with the troops, Schwarzkopf said in a phone interview.
``I was hot, tired and dirty and had just found out that we had to walk out and the last person I wanted to have around was a fancy-pants reporter,'' Schwarzkopf said. ``But what's different about him is that he really knew how to be at the right place at the right time without being intrusive. He was a friend right away.''
Galloway, Schwarzkopf said, ``is absolutely the finest combat correspondent I've ever known.''
``He truly understands what ground combat is all about,'' he said. ``He wasn't like many of the other war correspondents who wrote their stories from the rear area, or in the bars in Da Nang and Saigon. He lived the life of the grunts.''
At least once, a commander put Galloway behind a weapon.
In October 1965, after hearing that the U.S. Special Forces camp at Plei Me was surrounded and under siege, Galloway finagled his way aboard a helicopter heading that way.
When Galloway arrived at the tiny Plei Me camp, its commander, Maj. Charles Beckwith -- who later founded the Army's Delta Force -- was less than pleased that a reporter had managed to fly in when his troops were in desperate need of food, ammunition and medical supplies.
``He was jumping up and down on his hat when I got there,'' Galloway said. ``He told me he needed everything in the world but a God damn reporter.''
What he did need was someone to man a machine gun, and appointed Galloway to the task. Beckwith's instructions were simple, Galloway said.
``Don't shoot the little brown men inside the wire because they're mine, but shoot all the little brown men outside the wire,'' said Galloway, repeating Beckwith's words.
For four days and nights Galloway stayed on the line with Beckwith's troops. As Galloway was leaving after the battle, Beckwith gave the reporter an M-16 Galloway carried until the war ended in 1975.
``I told (Beckwith) that I wasn't a combatant and he said, `Son, in these mountains there's no such thing,' '' Galloway said.
A few weeks later, and 14 miles away, Galloway would face many of the same North Vietnamese troops who had attacked Plei Me.
On Nov. 14, hours after the fighting in the Ia Drang Valley had begun, Galloway hopped on a helicopter bound for the fighting. He was kicked off because there wasn't enough room. He boarded another helicopter, but Moore ordered it away because it was too dangerous to land.
Galloway was grounded at the rear command post, itching to get to the action, he said.
He hid out overnight at the base camp while other reporters retreated to beds and warm meals. Galloway asked Capt. Gregory Dillon if he could fly with him to the battle.
``He was such a young guy, but was dedicated to covering the war from the bottom end up,'' said Dillon, who retired as a colonel. ``It was pretty hairy there the first couple of days. We used to have an awful lot of reporters come in after the fact, but he was willing to take the same risks as the soldiers.''
They arrived on the morning of the second day of the battle. Galloway had just spoken with Nakayama when an Air Force F-100 Super Sabre dropped the jellied gasoline on the soldiers.
Two days later, Galloway flew out to Pleiku to file his story. For the work he did in Ia Drang, UPI gave him a raise, from $135 per week to $150.
``I had an exclusive in the biggest battle of the war,'' Galloway said. ``All I had to do was survive.''
On his first tour of Vietnam for UPI, Galloway spent 16 months in-country. He would return three times, the last in 1975 as the North Vietnamese headed to their victory.
++``A mentor of mine, Dickey Chapelle, who had covered World War II, once told
me you can have the best story in the world, but you have to get out and live to
file it,'' Galloway said.``War is a great story.
There is always room for you on the front page and in many ways it's a simple
story.
Afterwards, you wonder if you can cover normal life. I mean you wake up one day, when you're 30, and realize you have more friends dead than alive.''
Galloway lived in Asia for a total of 12 years before transferring to UPI's Moscow bureau. Later, he moved to UPI's Los Angeles bureau as its chief. In 1982, Galloway went to work for U.S. News & World Report, eventually going to work for the magazine in Washington, D.C.
But in 1992, Galloway would go into battle again, this time with tanks and armor roaring across the Iraqi desert. As he did in Vietnam, Galloway reported the war from the sharp end.
Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991, Galloway looked up his old friend H. Norman Schwarzkopf, now commanding the coalition forces. Galloway wanted to return to the First Cav, Schwarzkopf said, but the general knew where the real action would be.
``We argued about it because I wanted him to go on the 24th Mech (Infantry Division),'' Schwarzkopf said. ``I'm sure all the way there he was cursing me under his breath thinking that I wanted to give some press coverage to the 24th.''
But Galloway soon found out that the 24th was one of the armor units assigned to the charge across the desert in an end-run around heavily fortified Kuwait.
Since Galloway had been briefed on the plan, he was able to interview combat leaders before the battle, he said. The ground war started on a Monday, ended on Thursday, and Galloway's story was due on Friday.
Galloway had survived another war.
Joe Galloway still covers the military, but the men he met in Vietnam -- some of whom never returned home -- are never far from his mind. Galloway often gives talks on military bases, and reminds the men and women in uniform of the unspoken bond that unites a fighting force.
``I remind the soldiers that when they leave (the military) it will be the last day that the man on their left and the man on their right will die for them,'' Galloway said. ``Back when I started uncommon valor was a common virtue. It was during that time when I made some of the best and closest friends of my life.''
Post your comments about local news events
Front Page || Main Index || News || Business || Texas || South Texas Outdoors || Birdwatching || Sports || Entertainment || Selena || Education || South Texas Attractions || World Wide Web
http://www.digitaljournalist.org/issue0204/galloway4.htm
When it was done I flew back to Camp Holloway, hitched a ride to the MACV compound and got on that
creaky military phone system and called UPI Saigon.
Bureau chief Bryce Miller answered and ( I fed him my notebooks, names and hometowns,) and told him an
envelope of film was on the way.
When I was done he said: "Have you heard about Dickie Chappelle?"
I said no; what?
Dickie was a good friend.?
She had given me some good advice about what we were doing:
"The first rule for a war correspondent is you must LIVE to get out and tell the story."
I had somehow, against all odds, just done that.
Miller then said: "Dickie was killed a few days ago on a Marine operation near Chu Lai.
Someone stepped on a booby-trapped mortar shell and she bled to death."
I put down the phone and walked outside and sat down on the wooden steps of the Officers Club,
( put my face in my hands and wept for my old friend,)?
and all my new friends who had died in these terrible November
days.
ernie pyle statement? following
You cannot always remain a witness, above and removed from the story you are covering.
There are some events which demand your participation.
Joe Galloway a McClatchy Reporter, who thinks that "Murder is wonderful".
this statement by Joe Galloway can be found at this ural.
http://www.doingoralhistory.org/virtual_archive/2004/Papers/PDFs/A_Goldstein.pdf
Joe Galloway also says he has the works of Enie Pyle.
Joe Galloway " And they had wonderful murder cases in the flatlands of Kansas, I worked on the appeals
of Richard Hickock and Perry Smith".
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_Cold_Blood_(book)
It details the 1959 slaying of Herbert Clutter, a wealthy farmer from Holcomb, Kansas, his wife, and two
children.
Two ex-convicts on parole from the Kansas State Penitentiary, Richard "Dick" Hickock and Perry Edward
Smith, committed the robbery and murders on November 15, 1959.
Joe Galloway Military reporter VITENAM co author of We Were Soldiers Once and Young,
has been PLAGERIZING the works of Ernie Pyle and merroring Pyles life,
We Were Soldiers Once and Young has Ernie Pyle's style of writing in it.
I would like to know what you think. was it plagerized from Ernies works?
Joe Galloway has the complete works of Ernie Pyle.
Joe Galloway took this from Ernie Pyles works as true, But even Ridgway got it
wrong.
Joe Galloway took Ernies stament as fact as it is in Ernie Pyles works and makes an entire
speech about a untrue statement.
From Ernie Pyles War. by James Tobin 1997
Hardback page 107
Softback page107
As Ernie and his friends listened, Ridgway recited a favorite passage from
memory. It was Kiplings tribute to war reporters:
I have eaten your bread and salt.
I have drunk your water and wine.
In deaths ye died I have watched beside,
And the lives ye led were mine.
Joe Galloway from
The Military and the Media:One Man's Experience below
"I would leave you with these lines from Rudyard
Kipling in which he tried to
explain his relationship with the British Army.
They explain something of what I feel:
I've eaten your bread and salt,
I've drunk your water and wine;
The deaths ye’ve died I've watched beside,
And the lives that ye’ve led were mine.
But the verse is to Departmental Ditties, Not reporters
Prelude
http://www.poetryloverspage.com/poets/kipling/kipling_ind.html
Prelude
(to Departmental Ditties)
I have eaten your bread and salt.
I have drunk your water and wine.
In deaths ye died I have watched beside,
And the lives ye led were mine.
Was there aught that I did not share
In vigil or toil or ease, --
One joy or woe that I did not know,
Dear hearts across the seas?
I have written the tale of our life
For a sheltered people's mirth,
In jesting guise -- but ye are wise,
And ye know what the jest is worth.
Rudyard Kipling
There are more Plagerised Ernie Pyle in this speech
Click HERE for Media Relations page.
The Military and the Media:
One Man's Experience
Joe Galloway, Senior Writer, U.S. News & World Report
Prepared for delivery 22 October, 1996 at the Commandant's Lecture Series,
The Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
Thanks to Mr Galloway for permission to use it here.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I can think of no place more appropriate than the Air War College to share the following bit of personal data which was left out of the very kind introductory remarks by the General: I want you to know that I have personally been bombed, rocketed, strafed and napalmed by the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marines, U.S. Army Aviation and the air forces of sovereign states of South Vietnam, India and Pakistan, and maybe a couple more I don't even remember now.
You will note that I am not an inconsiderable target and yet I am here today, unscathed, unscratched and ready to talk. I hold no grudges; I'm just eternally grateful that in those few instances some guys couldn't shoot worth a s--t. I hasten to add that in literally hundreds of other instances, when the chips were really down, close air support kept me and a lot of other more deserving guys alive.
My one enduring image of what air power really means is one that I have carried in my mind and in my heart for more than 30 years. In the Ia Drang Valley in November of 1965 1 found myself with a battalion of the lst Cavalry Division, surrounded by two regiments of North Vietnamese regulars, 400 Americans versus 2,000 enemy. We were clinging desperately to a small clearing called Landing Zone X-Ray. On the morning of the second day we were under attack from three sides. Wave upon wave of enemy soldiers seemed to be literally growing out of the elephant grass. On the southeast perimeter, no more than 50 meters from where I lay, two platoons had been overrun and the line was wavering and cracking. The sergeant major came over, kicked me in the ribs and invited me to get up, make use of my M-16 and defend myself. Our forward air controller, Air Force Lieutenant Charlie Hastings, set aside his rifle and spoke into his radio the code word Broken Arrow. It signaled: "American unit in danger of being overrun."
With that, every available air resource in South Vietnam was diverted to our control. They came by the dozens and scores: Air Force, Navy, Marines. Old Spads, F-100's, F-4s, A-6,s. Charlie Hastings stacked them up over our heads in layers a thousand feet apart from 7,000 to 35,000 feet and they literally built a wall of steel and napalm around us. It was the most beautiful thing I had ever seen in my life.
In the middle of all this dust, smoke and confusion a tragic friendly fire incident occurred: A Supersabre unloaded two cans of napalm right into the command post area. They burst no more than 15 meters to the right of the command group and one scared reporter. Several American GI's were engulfed in the flames. I helped carry one of them out of the burning grass and I can still hear his screams and feel the bare bones of his ankles where the flesh had cooked off rubbing in the palms of my hands to this day. Then I witnessed something very important; something that placed it all in perspective: Lieutenant Charlie Hastings stood, heartstricken and trembling, before the battalion commander and tried to apologize for the terrible error. The commander looked him in the eyes and said: "Don't worry about that one, Charlie. Just keep ‘em coming."
Charlie Hastings kept them coming and that air support was the difference between life and death for the rest of us. That day, just one day past my 24th birthday, I learned that war is a hard and terrible business. Mistakes are made, but you must put them behind you and deal with the job at hand. By the way, Charlie Hastings served 30 years with the Air Force and retired a colonel three years ago. He's living the good life down in Arizona, trying hard to catch up on a list of Honey Do's that somehow accumulated over about 30 years. Charlie never forgot what it's like down there in the mud with the foot soldiers; and none of us ever forgot what it's like to holler HELP and have it rain down from the skies. Nobody ever won a battle or a war all by himself. It demands teamwork. If they teach you nothing else here and at the Army and Navy War Colleges, I pray to God they teach you that.
I was asked to give you my reflections on the Military-Media Relationship. That's awfully high-toned for someone who got his start covering Marine platoons in Vietnam in early 1965, worked his way up to Infantry companies and the occasional battalion-size operation and has always felt slightly uncomfortable with anything larger than that. I will confess, right up front, that I am partial to the Infantry; always have been. Some might find that puzzling if not perverse; that a civilian reporter, given a choice, would choose the hardest and least glamorous part of any war as the part he wishes to cover.
But there is method in that madness, and I would recommend it to my younger colleagues who may one day be called on to cover war. There, in the mud, is where war is most visible and easiest understood.
------------From Ernie Plye works also+
+There no one will lie to you; no one will try to put a spin on the truth. Those for whom death waits around the next bend or across the next rice paddy have no time and little taste for the games that are played with such relish in the rear.
+No one ever lied to me within the sound of the guns.
---------------
There, at the cutting edge of war, you find yourself welcomed and needed --- welcomed by the soldier as a token that someone in the outside world cares about him and how he lives and dies; Needed for the simple reason that an Infantry company or platoon in combat always needs another set of hands to carry ammo or haul water to the wounded or to pick up a rifle when the chips are really down. There you earn the sort of friendship that cannot be acquired in any other field of human endeavor --- there you forge bonds that will endure for a lifetime.
A few years ago I shook hands with one such battlefield friend and brother, agreeing on the terms by which we would jointly author a book. The lawyer who was negotiating the deal with the publisher asked to see the contract between us. We explained that there was no written contract; just that handshake. He looked horrified; we looked at him with pity. "You see," my buddy explained, "We have trusted each other with our lives; this is just a little matter of some money."
There is no secret in all of this. In every war there are always correspondents who walk this road; men and women whose fear of death is overcome by a fear of never having known the truth of war. The numbers are always disproportionate and they grow more so as rules and pools and fools proliferate.
When I look back at the military/media experience in the Gulf war it is with sadness for lost opportunities on both sides of the equation. Because of poor planning, paranoia and over-control, the details of a great victory of American arms were virtually lost to history. The crucial Army tank battles took place far from the lens of any camera; the Navy was over the horizon, out of sight and out of mind; and although the Air Force contributed all that nifty smart bomb film the vital human element of the Air Force story was largely missing, and we were left with the false image of a Nintendo War. The only thing the Pentagon had to hide in the Gulf was the finest military force this country has ever put into the field, and it did that very efficiently.
I am here to argue for more openness, more contact, more freedom between your profession and mine. In this one instance I believe familiarity would breed not contempt but trust and respect. My knowledge of and respect for you was born on the battlefields of Vietnam, learned alongside men like Lt. Charlie Hastings. That respect was reinforced by my experience in the Gulf, where I was the exception that proved the rule. There were around 1,000 correspondents accredited in the Gulf; 140 were permitted into the combat pools. There was precisely one reporter who went to war with a personal recommendation from General H. Norman Schwarzkopf in his hip pocket, and you're looking at him.
How this came to pass is just another war story. In 1965 in Vietnam I marched along some bad roads in the Central Highlands with a Vietnamese Airborne battalion and made the acquaintance of a young Army adviser, Major Norm Schwarzkopf. The battalion commander who taught Charlie Hastings and me some important lessons in the Ia Drang Valley in November, 1965, was a splendid combat commander named Hal Moore. Long before that, Hal Moore taught infantry tactics to hundreds of young cadets at West Point, including one named Norm Schwarzkopf. He even persuaded young Schwarzkopf to choose the Infantry as his branch, against the best advice of his father who warned him that he would be forever giving up any hope of making the rank of general as a mud-foot Infantry officer.
I dealt fairly and honestly with both those men, as I have always tried to do with all men, and what goes around comes around. Life may be short but memories are long.
Thanks to that trust, I was sent down to the 24th Mech two weeks before G-Day. On my first night there the Division CG called me to his TOC and pulled the cover off the battle map. What he said, as my eyes followed the arrows and the hair stood up on the back of my neck was this: I trust you because Schwarzkopf trusts you; but more than that, I trust you because you're coming with me. I never heard a more compelling argument for operational security in my life.
During the days before G-Day I visited every brigade and battalion in the division; saw the preparations; checked on the OR rates of the equipment; ate a lot of really bad chow; got lost traveling at night in the desert about fourteen times. Did a lot of listening and looking. And then we rode to battle together. I emerged from that experience with a damned good story of an American armored division at war .... and with something far more important: A whole new crop of comrades-in-arms and friends-for-life. We had trusted each other with our lives.
My regret, and one that I believe is now shared by the more thoughtful military leaders today, is that there was not an experienced team of reporters, photographers and cameramen traveling with every Brigade which crossed the berm into Kuwait and Iraq; stationed with every Air Force squadron which saw action; and on the bridge of every Navy ship offshore. Too much of the war either went uncovered, or the pooled dispatches and film took so long to reach the rear that the war was over and the stories never saw the light of day. More importantly, I think we will all have cause to regret the fact that a new generation of correspondents was not free to accompany a new generation of captains and majors of all the services to war --- to learn the ropes, earn the trust and build the bonds that last a lifetime.
Some of you seated here today --- the best and brightest of our nation's defenders --- are convinced that the press is your enemy. In any similar gathering of reporters there would, no doubt, be some who believe the same thing of you. This is a national tragedy.... and one that each of us has an obligation and a duty to do everything we can to repair and heal. There is more than enough blame and fault to go around, but that is not the point. Somehow my mind keeps going back to what my old friend Hal Moore tried to explain to that lawyer: once we have trusted each other with our lives .... everything else is small change.
Since Vietnam, I've thought long and hard about the relationship between your profession and mine -- professions that the founding fathers of this nation thought so important that they included specific definitions of our duties and responsibilities and rights in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
A generation of officers emerged from that searing, bitter, orphaned war looking for someone to blame for the failures manifest in our nation's defeat in Vietnam. Many chose to blame the media: Walter Cronkite lost the war; Dan Rather lost the war; Peter Arnett lost the war. By choosing the easy way out they obviated the painful need to carefully examine the root causes of our failure to win. By placing full blame and responsibility on the press they could avoid delving deeper, peeling to the underlying layers of the onion and exposing the more important failures of political leadership at home and military leadership right down the chain of command from the Joint Chiefs to the commander, U.S. Forces Vietnam and on down to Corps and Division.
How much easier it was to simply shoot the messengers. This red herring was dragged through the 0 Club bars of a thousand posts for a decade and more after the end of the Vietnam war. It became an article of faith for a generation of officers, and that led directly to the over-control and the spin control that allowed the Gulf War to be fought in a near-vacuum. Note that I say NEAR VACUUM, because nature abhors a vacuum.
For all the faultless planning and flawless execution of the plan, for all the success at locking the media out of the loop, locking them up in hotel briefing rooms far to the rear, in the end it was two very public television events that had much more to do with shaping the end of that war than all of the actions on or above the battlefield.
Those two events both occurred three days into the war. One was Gen. Schwartzkopf's Mother of All Briefings, a masterful exposition of what had occurred and why. Near the end of that briefing, flush with the feeling that he had knocked the ball over the fence, the general was asked a simple question: Have you achieved your objectives? He sang beautifully about how he had not wanted this war, had hoped to avoid fighting it, didn’t like seeing people dying in combat, and, yes, he supposed that his prime objective, the liberation of Kuwait, had been achieved. In short, my old friend allowed his bullfrog mouth to overload his tadpole ass. An hour later his phone began ringing with calls from the White House: Wasn't it time to begin working out the cease fire? No, said the general, he was still 48 or more hours away from completion of the plan; his tanks were still engaged heavily with units of the Republican Guard; the 24th Mech was only now pulling into place to close the sack behind the enemy in the Euphrates Valley. The voice on the phone responded, "General, that's not what you just told a worldwide TV audience of more than two billion people."
In the field, the commander of the 7th Corps armored phalanx had not heard Schwarzkopf's briefing. Gen. Fred Franks now knows that he should have had his TOC wired to receive CNN and he should have had a smart iron major sitting there monitoring it minute by minute. If he had done that, he would have known that the war plan he was following had just accelerated from late middle game to end game. When he supervised the rewriting of Field Manual 100-5, the successor to Air-Land Battle, Gen. Franks was careful to include that recommendation for the benefit of the next generation of commanders.
The second very public event was the broadcast of film of the so-called Highway of Death and its scenes of miles and miles of shattered and burning wreckage strewn along Highway 8. With the help of J-STARS imagery and the on-the-ground firsthand knowledge of a young Army major who months before had driven that highway and made careful note of the natural choke points, the Air Force had hit those choke points at the head and tail of the long retreating column of Iraqis fleeing Kuwait City. The film of the Highway of Death, unanalyzed, gave the impression that thousands and thousands of Iraqis, innocent and guilty alike, had been slaughtered. Even General Colin Powell believed that what had happened was a turkey shoot, and, in his words, Americans don't indulge in turkey shoots. He increased the pressure on General Schwarzkopf to conclude arrangements for an immediate cease fire.
Had there been even one or two reporters and cameramen on the ground, to take a firsthand look at that highway, we would have known then and there that the Highway of Death was, in fact, a Highway of Dead Toyotas. That when the choke points were closed and the column ceased movement all the drivers and passengers instantly knew what was coming, and instantly got out of their vehicles and beat feet out into the desert. That the casualties in the great turkey shoot were perhaps no more than 150 or 200 killed.
By locking out the media, by cutting them off from timely communication of their reports to the rear, the commanders in Riyadh and Washington had perhaps taken a certain amount of revenge for perceived sins of the media in covering Vietnam, but they had without doubt outsmarted themselves. A perfect example of what our British cousins call: Too clever by half.
I've since made a couple of other deployments, including Korea and Haiti, and closely watched the deployments to Somalia and Bosnia. Some of the lessons learned in the Gulf seem to be being applied with a good deal more foresight and planning by the new generation of commanders. There have been bobbles and missteps on both sides but nothing that I consider fatal.
But there is still that underlying suspicion: Your peers tell you that I, and people like me, are YOUR enemy. My peers tell me that you, and people like you, are MY enemy. The correct answer to both groups is: Bullshit! I much prefer to MAKE my own friends and enemies the old-fashioned way. I EARN them, and I am proud of them. I stubbornly refuse to inherit them. And I recommend that course to you as well.
What I am telling you is that familiarity far more often a breeds respect and friendship. Because of my experience in battle in Vietnam, when I was younger and skinnier and much dumber, I have been given the honor and privilege of open access to your tightly guarded world. When I boarded a Huey and flew away from Landing Zone X-Ray in the Ia Drang Valley on 16 November 1965, 1 left knowing that I was alive to tell this story only because 79 young Americans had given their lives to save mine, and in that same effort 130 others had been shattered by terrible wounds. I knew that I owed them, and those like them, a lifelong obligation to try to understand their world and to tell the their story to a country that too easily forgets the true cost of war.
Someday, some of you in this room will wear stars and carry the heavy responsibility of high command. Inevitably the day will come when you must lead your young lieutenants and captains into the horror that is war. When that day comes, or in the days before it comes, the phone will likely ring and some public affairs puke will be on the line asking you how many media pukes you want to take with you. When that day comes, the right answer is: yes sir, yes sir, I’ll take three bags full, but send me the brightest and best ones you have. Then farm them out with your lieutenants and captains and let them go to war together. The experience of war will create bonds between them that cannot be broken; the young reporters will learn to love the soldiers and airmen just as you and your lieutenants have learned; and in the end 99 percent of the coverage that flows from this experience will be entirely positive.
I want you to do this because it is right, and I ask you to do this so that there will be others like me thirty years down the road who know and love your profession and can translate it for the American public. I ask this because my time as a combat correspondent has, sadly, come to an end. All these years I have been free to go to wars, to do the .really dumb stuff that I always tried to conceal from my mother and my insurance agent, because I had a strong, loving wife at home to take care of our young sons if anything ever happened to me. She had all the ticket punches of a military wife, 11 moves in 22 years, sudden disappearances of her husband for long periods of time, living with the knowledge that a phone call or a knock on the door could bring news that she was a widow. She handled it all perfectly. Last January, after a brief, brutal battle with cancer, my wife, Theresa died. I am now trying to be father and mother to two boys, 16 and 18, and I find I am no longer free to grab my rucksack and my helmet and instinctively head for the sound of the guns. My obligation and promise to her and to our sons must take precedence.
I thank you and all those like you for sharing your world with me. You have shared the last two sips of water in your canteen on a hot jungle trail; you've shared the only cup of hot coffee in a hundred miles on a cold desert morning in the Euphrates Valley; and always you have shared what is in your hearts. Your world, your profession, has given me the best friends of my life and both the greatest happiness and greatest sorrow I have ever known.
+I would leave you with these lines from Rudyard Kipling in which he tried to explain his relationship with the British Army. They explain something of what I feel:
I have eaten your bread and salt.
I have drunk your water and wine.
In deaths ye died I have watched beside,
And the lives ye led were mine.
God bless you and God bless our country.
-----------------
Forwarded Message:
Subj: Joe Galloway Has been PLAGERIZING the works of ERNIE PYLE since 1963
Date: 10/30/2006 8:19:36 PM Pacific Standard Time
From: Lzalbany65
To: contact@mcclatchy.com
CC: letters-acg01@armchairgeneral.com
Russell L. Ross
1741 maysong ct
San Jose, CA 95131
PH 408 926-9336
Joe Galloway Military reporter VITENAM co author of We Were Soldiers Once and Young,
has been PLAGERIZING the works of Ernie Pyle and merroring Pyles life,
We Were Soldiers Once and Young has Ernie Pyle's style of writing in it.
I would like to know what you think. was it plagerized from Ernies works?
Joe Galloway has the complete works of Ernie Pyle.
Joe Galloway took this from Ernie Pyles works as true, But even Ridgway got it
wrong.
Joe Galloway took Ernies stament as fact as it is in Ernie Pyles works and makes an entire
speech about a untrue statement.
From Ernie Pyles War. by James Tobin 1997
Hardback page 107
Softback page107
As Ernie and his friends listened, Ridgway recited a favorite passage from
memory. It was Kiplings tribute to war reporters:
I have eaten your bread and salt.
I have drunk your water and wine.
In deaths ye died I have watched beside,
And the lives ye led were mine.
Joe Galloway from
The Military and the Media:One Man's Experience below
"I would leave you with these lines from Rudyard Kipling in which he tried to
explain his relationship with the British Army. They explain something of what I feel:
I've eaten your bread and salt,
I've drunk your water and wine;
The deaths ye’ve died I've watched beside,
And the lives that ye’ve led were mine.
But the verse is to Departmental Ditties, Not reporters
Prelude
http://www.poetryloverspage.com/poets/kipling/kipling_ind.html
Prelude
(to Departmental Ditties)
I have eaten your bread and salt.
I have drunk your water and wine.
In deaths ye died I have watched beside,
And the lives ye led were mine.
Was there aught that I did not share
In vigil or toil or ease, --
One joy or woe that I did not know,
Dear hearts across the seas?
I have written the tale of our life
For a sheltered people's mirth,
In jesting guise -- but ye are wise,
And ye know what the jest is worth.
Rudyard Kipling
There are more Plagerised Ernie Pyle in this speech
Click HERE for Media Relations page.
The Military and the Media:
One Man's Experience
Joe Galloway, Senior Writer, U.S. News & World Report
Prepared for delivery 22 October, 1996 at the Commandant's Lecture Series,
The Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
Thanks to Mr Galloway for permission to use it here.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I can think of no place more appropriate than the Air War College to share the following bit of personal data which was left out of the very kind introductory remarks by the General: I want you to know that I have personally been bombed, rocketed, strafed and napalmed by the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marines, U.S. Army Aviation and the air forces of sovereign states of South Vietnam, India and Pakistan, and maybe a couple more I don't even remember now.
You will note that I am not an inconsiderable target and yet I am here today, unscathed, unscratched and ready to talk. I hold no grudges; I'm just eternally grateful that in those few instances some guys couldn't shoot worth a s--t. I hasten to add that in literally hundreds of other instances, when the chips were really down, close air support kept me and a lot of other more deserving guys alive.
My one enduring image of what air power really means is one that I have carried in my mind and in my heart for more than 30 years. In the Ia Drang Valley in November of 1965 1 found myself with a battalion of the lst Cavalry Division, surrounded by two regiments of North Vietnamese regulars, 400 Americans versus 2,000 enemy. We were clinging desperately to a small clearing called Landing Zone X-Ray. On the morning of the second day we were under attack from three sides. Wave upon wave of enemy soldiers seemed to be literally growing out of the elephant grass. On the southeast perimeter, no more than 50 meters from where I lay, two platoons had been overrun and the line was wavering and cracking. The sergeant major came over, kicked me in the ribs and invited me to get up, make use of my M-16 and defend myself. Our forward air controller, Air Force Lieutenant Charlie Hastings, set aside his rifle and spoke into his radio the code word Broken Arrow. It signaled: "American unit in danger of being overrun."
With that, every available air resource in South Vietnam was diverted to our control. They came by the dozens and scores: Air Force, Navy, Marines. Old Spads, F-100's, F-4s, A-6,s. Charlie Hastings stacked them up over our heads in layers a thousand feet apart from 7,000 to 35,000 feet and they literally built a wall of steel and napalm around us. It was the most beautiful thing I had ever seen in my life.
In the middle of all this dust, smoke and confusion a tragic friendly fire incident occurred: A Supersabre unloaded two cans of napalm right into the command post area. They burst no more than 15 meters to the right of the command group and one scared reporter. Several American GI's were engulfed in the flames. I helped carry one of them out of the burning grass and I can still hear his screams and feel the bare bones of his ankles where the flesh had cooked off rubbing in the palms of my hands to this day. Then I witnessed something very important; something that placed it all in perspective: Lieutenant Charlie Hastings stood, heartstricken and trembling, before the battalion commander and tried to apologize for the terrible error. The commander looked him in the eyes and said: "Don't worry about that one, Charlie. Just keep ‘em coming."
Charlie Hastings kept them coming and that air support was the difference between life and death for the rest of us. That day, just one day past my 24th birthday, I learned that war is a hard and terrible business. Mistakes are made, but you must put them behind you and deal with the job at hand. By the way, Charlie Hastings served 30 years with the Air Force and retired a colonel three years ago. He's living the good life down in Arizona, trying hard to catch up on a list of Honey Do's that somehow accumulated over about 30 years. Charlie never forgot what it's like down there in the mud with the foot soldiers; and none of us ever forgot what it's like to holler HELP and have it rain down from the skies. Nobody ever won a battle or a war all by himself. It demands teamwork. If they teach you nothing else here and at the Army and Navy War Colleges, I pray to God they teach you that.
I was asked to give you my reflections on the Military-Media Relationship. That's awfully high-toned for someone who got his start covering Marine platoons in Vietnam in early 1965, worked his way up to Infantry companies and the occasional battalion-size operation and has always felt slightly uncomfortable with anything larger than that. I will confess, right up front, that I am partial to the Infantry; always have been. Some might find that puzzling if not perverse; that a civilian reporter, given a choice, would choose the hardest and least glamorous part of any war as the part he wishes to cover.
But there is method in that madness, and I would recommend it to my younger colleagues who may one day be called on to cover war. There, in the mud, is where war is most visible and easiest understood.
------------From Ernie Plye works also+
+There no one will lie to you; no one will try to put a spin on the truth. Those for whom death waits around the next bend or across the next rice paddy have no time and little taste for the games that are played with such relish in the rear.
+No one ever lied to me within the sound of the guns.
---------------
There, at the cutting edge of war, you find yourself welcomed and needed --- welcomed by the soldier as a token that someone in the outside world cares about him and how he lives and dies; Needed for the simple reason that an Infantry company or platoon in combat always needs another set of hands to carry ammo or haul water to the wounded or to pick up a rifle when the chips are really down. There you earn the sort of friendship that cannot be acquired in any other field of human endeavor --- there you forge bonds that will endure for a lifetime.
A few years ago I shook hands with one such battlefield friend and brother, agreeing on the terms by which we would jointly author a book. The lawyer who was negotiating the deal with the publisher asked to see the contract between us. We explained that there was no written contract; just that handshake. He looked horrified; we looked at him with pity. "You see," my buddy explained, "We have trusted each other with our lives; this is just a little matter of some money."
There is no secret in all of this. In every war there are always correspondents who walk this road; men and women whose fear of death is overcome by a fear of never having known the truth of war. The numbers are always disproportionate and they grow more so as rules and pools and fools proliferate.
When I look back at the military/media experience in the Gulf war it is with sadness for lost opportunities on both sides of the equation. Because of poor planning, paranoia and over-control, the details of a great victory of American arms were virtually lost to history. The crucial Army tank battles took place far from the lens of any camera; the Navy was over the horizon, out of sight and out of mind; and although the Air Force contributed all that nifty smart bomb film the vital human element of the Air Force story was largely missing, and we were left with the false image of a Nintendo War. The only thing the Pentagon had to hide in the Gulf was the finest military force this country has ever put into the field, and it did that very efficiently.
I am here to argue for more openness, more contact, more freedom between your profession and mine. In this one instance I believe familiarity would breed not contempt but trust and respect. My knowledge of and respect for you was born on the battlefields of Vietnam, learned alongside men like Lt. Charlie Hastings. That respect was reinforced by my experience in the Gulf, where I was the exception that proved the rule. There were around 1,000 correspondents accredited in the Gulf; 140 were permitted into the combat pools. There was precisely one reporter who went to war with a personal recommendation from General H. Norman Schwarzkopf in his hip pocket, and you're looking at him.
How this came to pass is just another war story. In 1965 in Vietnam I marched along some bad roads in the Central Highlands with a Vietnamese Airborne battalion and made the acquaintance of a young Army adviser, Major Norm Schwarzkopf. The battalion commander who taught Charlie Hastings and me some important lessons in the Ia Drang Valley in November, 1965, was a splendid combat commander named Hal Moore. Long before that, Hal Moore taught infantry tactics to hundreds of young cadets at West Point, including one named Norm Schwarzkopf. He even persuaded young Schwarzkopf to choose the Infantry as his branch, against the best advice of his father who warned him that he would be forever giving up any hope of making the rank of general as a mud-foot Infantry officer.
I dealt fairly and honestly with both those men, as I have always tried to do with all men, and what goes around comes around. Life may be short but memories are long.
Thanks to that trust, I was sent down to the 24th Mech two weeks before G-Day. On my first night there the Division CG called me to his TOC and pulled the cover off the battle map. What he said, as my eyes followed the arrows and the hair stood up on the back of my neck was this: I trust you because Schwarzkopf trusts you; but more than that, I trust you because you're coming with me. I never heard a more compelling argument for operational security in my life.
During the days before G-Day I visited every brigade and battalion in the division; saw the preparations; checked on the OR rates of the equipment; ate a lot of really bad chow; got lost traveling at night in the desert about fourteen times. Did a lot of listening and looking. And then we rode to battle together. I emerged from that experience with a damned good story of an American armored division at war .... and with something far more important: A whole new crop of comrades-in-arms and friends-for-life. We had trusted each other with our lives.
My regret, and one that I believe is now shared by the more thoughtful military leaders today, is that there was not an experienced team of reporters, photographers and cameramen traveling with every Brigade which crossed the berm into Kuwait and Iraq; stationed with every Air Force squadron which saw action; and on the bridge of every Navy ship offshore. Too much of the war either went uncovered, or the pooled dispatches and film took so long to reach the rear that the war was over and the stories never saw the light of day. More importantly, I think we will all have cause to regret the fact that a new generation of correspondents was not free to accompany a new generation of captains and majors of all the services to war --- to learn the ropes, earn the trust and build the bonds that last a lifetime.
Some of you seated here today --- the best and brightest of our nation's defenders --- are convinced that the press is your enemy. In any similar gathering of reporters there would, no doubt, be some who believe the same thing of you. This is a national tragedy.... and one that each of us has an obligation and a duty to do everything we can to repair and heal. There is more than enough blame and fault to go around, but that is not the point. Somehow my mind keeps going back to what my old friend Hal Moore tried to explain to that lawyer: once we have trusted each other with our lives .... everything else is small change.
Since Vietnam, I've thought long and hard about the relationship between your profession and mine -- professions that the founding fathers of this nation thought so important that they included specific definitions of our duties and responsibilities and rights in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
A generation of officers emerged from that searing, bitter, orphaned war looking for someone to blame for the failures manifest in our nation's defeat in Vietnam. Many chose to blame the media: Walter Cronkite lost the war; Dan Rather lost the war; Peter Arnett lost the war. By choosing the easy way out they obviated the painful need to carefully examine the root causes of our failure to win. By placing full blame and responsibility on the press they could avoid delving deeper, peeling to the underlying layers of the onion and exposing the more important failures of political leadership at home and military leadership right down the chain of command from the Joint Chiefs to the commander, U.S. Forces Vietnam and on down to Corps and Division.
How much easier it was to simply shoot the messengers. This red herring was dragged through the 0 Club bars of a thousand posts for a decade and more after the end of the Vietnam war. It became an article of faith for a generation of officers, and that led directly to the over-control and the spin control that allowed the Gulf War to be fought in a near-vacuum. Note that I say NEAR VACUUM, because nature abhors a vacuum.
For all the faultless planning and flawless execution of the plan, for all the success at locking the media out of the loop, locking them up in hotel briefing rooms far to the rear, in the end it was two very public television events that had much more to do with shaping the end of that war than all of the actions on or above the battlefield.
Those two events both occurred three days into the war. One was Gen. Schwartzkopf's Mother of All Briefings, a masterful exposition of what had occurred and why. Near the end of that briefing, flush with the feeling that he had knocked the ball over the fence, the general was asked a simple question: Have you achieved your objectives? He sang beautifully about how he had not wanted this war, had hoped to avoid fighting it, didn’t like seeing people dying in combat, and, yes, he supposed that his prime objective, the liberation of Kuwait, had been achieved. In short, my old friend allowed his bullfrog mouth to overload his tadpole ass. An hour later his phone began ringing with calls from the White House: Wasn't it time to begin working out the cease fire? No, said the general, he was still 48 or more hours away from completion of the plan; his tanks were still engaged heavily with units of the Republican Guard; the 24th Mech was only now pulling into place to close the sack behind the enemy in the Euphrates Valley. The voice on the phone responded, "General, that's not what you just told a worldwide TV audience of more than two billion people."
In the field, the commander of the 7th Corps armored phalanx had not heard Schwarzkopf's briefing. Gen. Fred Franks now knows that he should have had his TOC wired to receive CNN and he should have had a smart iron major sitting there monitoring it minute by minute. If he had done that, he would have known that the war plan he was following had just accelerated from late middle game to end game. When he supervised the rewriting of Field Manual 100-5, the successor to Air-Land Battle, Gen. Franks was careful to include that recommendation for the benefit of the next generation of commanders.
The second very public event was the broadcast of film of the so-called Highway of Death and its scenes of miles and miles of shattered and burning wreckage strewn along Highway 8. With the help of J-STARS imagery and the on-the-ground firsthand knowledge of a young Army major who months before had driven that highway and made careful note of the natural choke points, the Air Force had hit those choke points at the head and tail of the long retreating column of Iraqis fleeing Kuwait City. The film of the Highway of Death, unanalyzed, gave the impression that thousands and thousands of Iraqis, innocent and guilty alike, had been slaughtered. Even General Colin Powell believed that what had happened was a turkey shoot, and, in his words, Americans don't indulge in turkey shoots. He increased the pressure on General Schwarzkopf to conclude arrangements for an immediate cease fire.
Had there been even one or two reporters and cameramen on the ground, to take a firsthand look at that highway, we would have known then and there that the Highway of Death was, in fact, a Highway of Dead Toyotas. That when the choke points were closed and the column ceased movement all the drivers and passengers instantly knew what was coming, and instantly got out of their vehicles and beat feet out into the desert. That the casualties in the great turkey shoot were perhaps no more than 150 or 200 killed.
By locking out the media, by cutting them off from timely communication of their reports to the rear, the commanders in Riyadh and Washington had perhaps taken a certain amount of revenge for perceived sins of the media in covering Vietnam, but they had without doubt outsmarted themselves. A perfect example of what our British cousins call: Too clever by half.
I've since made a couple of other deployments, including Korea and Haiti, and closely watched the deployments to Somalia and Bosnia. Some of the lessons learned in the Gulf seem to be being applied with a good deal more foresight and planning by the new generation of commanders. There have been bobbles and missteps on both sides but nothing that I consider fatal.
But there is still that underlying suspicion: Your peers tell you that I, and people like me, are YOUR enemy. My peers tell me that you, and people like you, are MY enemy. The correct answer to both groups is: Bullshit! I much prefer to MAKE my own friends and enemies the old-fashioned way. I EARN them, and I am proud of them. I stubbornly refuse to inherit them. And I recommend that course to you as well.
What I am telling you is that familiarity far more often a breeds respect and friendship. Because of my experience in battle in Vietnam, when I was younger and skinnier and much dumber, I have been given the honor and privilege of open access to your tightly guarded world. When I boarded a Huey and flew away from Landing Zone X-Ray in the Ia Drang Valley on 16 November 1965, 1 left knowing that I was alive to tell this story only because 79 young Americans had given their lives to save mine, and in that same effort 130 others had been shattered by terrible wounds. I knew that I owed them, and those like them, a lifelong obligation to try to understand their world and to tell the their story to a country that too easily forgets the true cost of war.
Someday, some of you in this room will wear stars and carry the heavy responsibility of high command. Inevitably the day will come when you must lead your young lieutenants and captains into the horror that is war. When that day comes, or in the days before it comes, the phone will likely ring and some public affairs puke will be on the line asking you how many media pukes you want to take with you. When that day comes, the right answer is: yes sir, yes sir, I’ll take three bags full, but send me the brightest and best ones you have. Then farm them out with your lieutenants and captains and let them go to war together. The experience of war will create bonds between them that cannot be broken; the young reporters will learn to love the soldiers and airmen just as you and your lieutenants have learned; and in the end 99 percent of the coverage that flows from this experience will be entirely positive.
I want you to do this because it is right, and I ask you to do this so that there will be others like me thirty years down the road who know and love your profession and can translate it for the American public. I ask this because my time as a combat correspondent has, sadly, come to an end. All these years I have been free to go to wars, to do the .really dumb stuff that I always tried to conceal from my mother and my insurance agent, because I had a strong, loving wife at home to take care of our young sons if anything ever happened to me. She had all the ticket punches of a military wife, 11 moves in 22 years, sudden disappearances of her husband for long periods of time, living with the knowledge that a phone call or a knock on the door could bring news that she was a widow. She handled it all perfectly. Last January, after a brief, brutal battle with cancer, my wife, Theresa died. I am now trying to be father and mother to two boys, 16 and 18, and I find I am no longer free to grab my rucksack and my helmet and instinctively head for the sound of the guns. My obligation and promise to her and to our sons must take precedence.
I thank you and all those like you for sharing your world with me. You have shared the last two sips of water in your canteen on a hot jungle trail; you've shared the only cup of hot coffee in a hundred miles on a cold desert morning in the Euphrates Valley; and always you have shared what is in your hearts. Your world, your profession, has given me the best friends of my life and both the greatest happiness and greatest sorrow I have ever known.
+I would leave you with these lines from Rudyard Kipling in which he tried to explain his relationship with the British Army. They explain something of what I feel:
I have eaten your bread and salt.
I have drunk your water and wine.
In deaths ye died I have watched beside,
And the lives ye led were mine.
God bless you and God bless our country.
MOORE LEFT SOME OF HIS DEAD TROOPS ON X-RAY!
Moore said he wouldnt leave any troop behind on the Battlefield dead or alive.
ArmChair General
"Didn’t you go back to the Ia Drang in March for Operation LINCOLN?"
+Steven R. Hansen "Yes, we did return to the Ia Drang.
++In fact, we air assaulted back into XRay.
++It was quiet."
++The mission was to search for and retrieve the remains of some MIAs.
++We found them.
The battlefield had been cleaned up pretty good by both sides.
We found a scattering of stuff and I noticed the remains of one NVA soldier near the "Ant
Hill" that sheltered the command post during the battle.
Isnt it strange! Col. Moore said he brought every one back even the dead.
( page 198, We were Soldiers Once and Young.)Hardback
Moore said he wasnt leaving anyone on LZXRAY !
He did!, then he sneaks back to retrive the ones he left behind on X-Ray.
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/articles.php?p=2785&page=1
Memories of Vietnam
Submitted by Stephane Moutin-Luyat
Steve Hansen
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/articles.php?p&page=1&p=2785&page=7
Memories of Vietnam
Tuesday, July 18, 2006 by Stephane Moutin-Luyat
Steve Hansen, two-tour veteran of the Vietnam war, shares his thoughts and experiences in
this fascinating interview.
http://www.thenewamerican.com/tna/2002/03-25-2002/vo18no06_hal_moore.htm
The Real Hal Moore
Interview of Lt. General Harold G. Moore by William F. Jasper
TNA: Both in the book and the movie, your commitment and your promise to
your men, to bring them all home, dead or alive, comes through very
strongly.
Was that Army doctrine or was that purely Hal Moore?
Moore: No, that was not Army doctrine.
I was very close to my men.
When we were ordered to Vietnam in August 1965, I had been training my
battalion for 14 months.
I knew all my NCOs, my sergeants.
We trained together intensely.
We trusted each other, knew our lives depended on each other.
We were a family of fighting men.
Before we left for Vietnam, I gathered all my men on the parade ground at Ft.
Benning, Georgia, just like in the movie, and I told them that we?re going into
battle far from home against a tough enemy on his own turf.
I told them: "Some of us are going to die ? maybe me, certainly some of you.
But I promise you this: If you go down, I?m going to bring you back.
And if I go down, I hope you bring me back."
In later years, I?ve had many of my troopers tell me that that promise meant a
great deal to them and helped them in battle, because they knew if they went
down that they would not be left lying on the ground for the vultures, insects,
and weather, but would be brought back to their families for burial.
And I never lost a man in two wars, Korea or Vietnam.
After the Ia Drang battle, I was promoted, made commander of a brigade of
3,000 men.
We lost a man on the Bong Son Plain.
He got separated from his unit.
I turned out the whole brigade and we hunted for him for two days.
We finally found him; he was dead, but we brought him home.
MOORE LEFT SOME OF HIS DEAD TROOPS ON X-RAY!
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/articles.php?p&page=1&p=2785&page=7
» Home > Personal Stories, Front Page Features > Memories of Vietnam
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Memories of Vietnam
Submitted by Stephane Moutin-Luyat
The NCOs that came in as replacements were drawn from Army units in the States and Europe and they were trained, capable men. So to were some of the lower graded soldiers. And of course we received some privates direct from Basic and Advanced training. Later in the war almost every replacement would be raw meat.
In December I went on R&R to Hong Kong. Most of the men wanted Bangkok. It had a reputation for being cheap and wide open. I wanted Hong Kong because I wanted an escape from Viet Nam and anything like it. And while Hong Kong was Asian it was also British and a very nice place to be. I enjoyed my self immensely.
Shortly after my return I was sitting in the NCO club we built with some friends and looked around. Almost all the faces were new. Those of us who had been together at Benning stayed connected. But we were more reserved about the replacements. Why make a friend just to see him die.
Read LTC Moore’s after action report in full here
All those new recruits would soon experience combat. In January, the 1st Cav launched Operation MASHER in the populated coastal province of Binh Dinh, the biggest search & destroy operation in Vietnam to date, and once again the 1/7 and 3d Brigade would find themselves in heavy fighting, especially around the hamlet of Phung Du north of Bong Son. It’s always been one of the most interesting operation for me, what can you tell us about it? it must have been a complete change of scenery from the Central Highlands.
When I returned from R&R I got a new job. Warren Adams, the company First Sergeant, pulled me up to Company Headquarters to be the field logistics sergeant. It was not a real job, in the sense of being authorized in the official Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) but it was necessary function during operations.
D Company was not a maneuver element. The three platoons, Recon, Heavy Mortar, and Anti-Tank were combat support elements and their location and employment were usually established by the Battalion Operations Officer or S3. The D company CP was usually, but not always, collocated with the heavy mortars. One of our missions was to monitor the battalion command radio frequency and track the location of the other companies. By staying abreast of the situation we were ready to reconstitute the battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC) if the principal TOC was overrun or lost during an air lift.
Bong Son was my first operation as a member of the company field headquarters.
We had operated in populated areas around Qui Nhon during our initial toughing up phase and while we were reconstituting after the Ia Drang. But we had not made any significant contact. And the populace, at least on the surface, seemed loyal to the South Vietnamese Government. At Bong Son we would engage NVA regulars again and much of the populace was openly hostile to us.
Having said this, I also must say that I did not participate directly in any combat at Bong Son. But I did monitor the radios and I was very aware of the intense fighting that was going on just a kilometre or two from our support locations. And, for a time, we were located at the airstrip and I saw the casualties come in. For me, it was kind of sureal. I was there but I was somewhat detached. I think it was a coping mechanism. A bit of guilt for being relatively safe and a bit of relief for not being at risk.
We operated on the Bong Son plain twice. In January 66 and again in March (my recal may be faulty). No matter what the higher ups called the operations there we called them Bong Son One and Bong Son Two. At reunions we still talk about them. Most agree that the actual combat was worse than anything at XRay even though the tactical situations never was,
At this time of my life the events of Bong Son One and Two run together.
Here are some things I recall.
Riding by truck all night from An Khe, down Highway 19 to Qui Nhon and then up Highway 1 to Bong Son, immediately boarding Hueys and making a combat assault. My understanding is we did this because Bong Son was to far from An Khe to stage the assault from there. But the Hueys could fly empty from An Khe and arrive with enough fuel to stage the assault. In so doing, we achieved tactical surprise. It was a well conceived and brilliantly executed maneuver.
Walking in sand, sleeping in sand, eating sand, trying to dig in in sand, hating sand.
Watching a Charlie model Huey gun ship coming in with fuel streaming out of it. The left side opened up like a shark bite and the gunner dead and hanging by a strap. Aparently one or more of the rockets in the missing pod had detonated on launch or been hit by ground fire.
Going to the S1 tent to pick up replacements. Most were 82nd Airborne veterans of the Dominican Republic. On the way back we passed by Charlie Med. There were more dead GIs wrapped in ponchos there than the 82nd had lost during their entire mission in the DR.
Learning Sergeant First Class Kennedy, a C Company hero in the Ia Drang, had been killed by friendly fire. Fire from a 106 in our own Anti Tank platoon.
Hearing an explosion nearby and finding out one of our 82nd Airborne replacements had snagged a grenade when he was setting his 81 mm mortar bipod down. It blew his arm off and he died almost immediately in front of me.
Seeing a senior NCO (not a D Company man) throw his boots down a well and reporting them stolen while he slept.
Seeing Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky and his wife in matching black flight suits walking among the ordinary soldiers and thanking them for their service.
Showing no interest in seeing Nancy Sinatra put on a USO show.
Seeing those damn pictures in Life magazine and feeling guilty and relieved all over again.
====================================================================
Didn’t you go back to the Ia Drang in March for Operation LINCOLN? not sure 1/7 was involved in this one, but after Bong Son the Cav was known as the "swing" division, alternating between the coastal plain and the Central Highlands. How was your perception of the war at that time after several months in country? I guess morale was pretty high in the 1st Cav, did you have the feeling that you were turning the tide in Vietnam, were you told anything about the big picture?
Yes, we did return to the Ia Drang. In fact, we air assaulted back into XRay. It was quiet. The mission was to search for and retrieve the remains of some MIAs. We found them.
The battlefield had been cleaned up pretty good by both sides. We found a scattering of stuff and I noticed the remains of one NVA soldier near the "Ant Hill" that sheltered the command post during the battle.
====================================================================
[continued on next page]
Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Russell – hope you are doing OK.
The answer to your question is very simple. Remember that Moore was the Brigade Commander when they went back into the Ia Drang in April and did indeed revisit Xray as well as Albany. One of the missions was to look for 2/7 CAV MIAs at LZ Albany – and they found a few – maybe even some of the guys from your Platoon. He discusses this on pages 320 and 321 of the hardcover book.
During the November battle, Moore was only the Battalion Commander at Xray – and fully accounted for all his men – no MIAs among the units that fought at Xray at the time of the handover of command at the conclusion of that fight.
Hope this addresses your concern. I’m sure you will do more research and check the morning reports and other historical documents that pertain to the 1/7 CAV and confirm that there were no MIAs from that unit. In fact, it looks like there were 4 MIAs from 2/7 and all were recovered in the April operation – closing the book on the total battle.
Take Care and all best,
Steve
Subj: Crandall was required to pick up wounded
troops.
MOORE "IT WASENT CRANDALL'S JOB TO HAUL OUT
WOUNDED"
CRANDALL "IT WASENT MY JOB TO HAUL OUT WOUNDED!"
BUT Crandall did Haul out a NON WOUNDED PAVN
ENEMY TROOP THOUGH.
CRANDALL NOW HAS TO DO SOMTHING HE DOSENT WANT TO
DO HAUL OUT WOUNDED AMERICAN TROOPS.
CRANDALL "And so that left me having to carry
ammo and medical supplies in and to take
out wounded."
Moore, CRANDALL "It wasn't his ( MY ) job" To haul out the WOUNDED
Was CRANDALL was in a union? NOT HIS JOB to haul WOUNDED! American troops.
FALSE!
Crandall was suppose to pick up the WOUNDED
Its Called BACKHAUL.
Field Manual 57-35 Air Mobile Operations 1963.
1965 Field Manual 7-20 Battalions Infantry,
BATTALION COMMANDERS HANDBOOK
1963 Field Manual 57-35 Air Mobile Operations
mdcrandall
Joined: 13 Aug 2002
Posts: 161
Posted: Tue Jan 14, 2003 2:42 pm Post subject: http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/movies/61318_crandall08.shtml
I'll let Dad tell his own story. With only the addition that he was catching a nap on a cot in the ops tent because he thought he was going to have to go back in that night and he wasn't fully awake when the guy grabbed him so considering the fact he had been being shot at all day I'm not surprised he pulled out his gun first and thought to ask questions later --- and once he figured out what was going on he was probably just plain pissed off.
Quote:
Real-life hero: 'All day long it was blood'
Friday, March 8, 2002
By KRISTIN DIZON
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REPORTER
One of the most dramatic moments in the new Vietnam war film "We Were Soldiers" -- the No. 1 movie in the country last weekend -- depicts jovial helicopter pilot Maj. Bruce Crandall pulling a gun on another officer who questioned his judgment.
It wasn't Hollywood fiction: Crandall, a Washington native and resident, did indeed point a gun at a fellow soldier, but in this case, reality was racier than the screen take.
The man yanked Crandall off a cot and made off-color remarks about his mother. "And so I did go after a weapon," said Crandall, now 69. "But I didn't point it at his head; I pointed it at his crotch.
"If he didn't have the balls to fight the enemy, I mentioned that he sure as hell shouldn't have the balls to come looking me up."
The movie, starring Mel Gibson, is based on the book, "We Were Soldiers Once ... and Young," by retired Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore and journalist Joseph L. Galloway. It's the detailed chronicle of a bloody battle in the Ia Drang valley near the Cambodian border in November 1965.
Last week, Crandall and his wife, Arlene, watched the film with President and Mrs. Bush at the White House. The president told Crandall that it was a story that had to be told.
Crandall's dramatic confrontation came after he tried to
lead two medevac helicopters into a "hot" zone, where
U.S. forces were taking heavy fire and wounded lay in
the dust.
The choppers landed briefly, then flew away -- it was too
hot for them.
"And so that left me having to carry ammo and medical
supplies in and to take out wounded."
It wasn't his job. ,,FALSE
Crandall was suppose to pick up the WOUNDED
Field Manual 57-35 Air Mobile Operations 1963.
Its Called BACKHAUL.
As head of the "A" Company, 229th air assault division
of the Army's First Cavalry Division, Crandall was
supposed to ferry troops on the 16 helicopters he
commanded.
"Every one of the guys I supported knew that if they got hit, I'd come," he said. "And if I went down, they would protect me."
He flew 22 missions in the lead chopper that day -- the first major battle of the war between U.S. and North Vietnamese forces.
Moore, the ground commander played by Gibson, wrote Crandall a note of thanks. "Bruce, had you not stepped forward, organized and led this extraordinarily heroic effort -- we on that field would have gone down," Moore wrote.
Crandall, a native of Olympia and a former all-America high school baseball star, now lives in Manchester on the Kitsap Peninsula. In his senior year at Olympia High School, the left-fielder hit .600 and dreamed of major league baseball. "I wanted to be drafted, but not by the Army. I wanted to be drafted by the Yankees or Baltimore."
The Army punched his Selective Service card in 1953, the last year of the Korean War. Engineering and flight school followed, then Crandall flew mapping missions over remote areas of the Arctic, North Africa, South America and elsewhere. While in the Army, Crandall took 17 years to graduate from college, attending night classes at seven universities.
Crandall was an adviser to "We Were Soldiers." "It portrays accurately what war is like and what it was like that day," said Crandall, who thinks the Vietnam War was winnable had political restraints been lifted. Some things in the film were consolidated, left out or embellished, but other details are quite authentic, he said.
Crandall, portrayed by Greg Kinnear, really did puff on a cigar as he flew off to the battle.
After flying for more than 16 hours the first day of the fight, Crandall stepped out of his blood-drenched chopper and vomited.
"All day long it was blood. My crew chief got shot in the throat. And my aircraft got washed out with buckets -- that happened," Crandall recalled in the West Seattle home of the youngest of his three sons. And that's what Crandall wants people to take from the film: "What we want people to see is how bad war is."
Rescue missions in 1966 earned him a Helicopter Heroism Award. He's also a recipient of the Purple Heart, the Bronze Star and four Distinguished Flying Crosses, among other medals and awards. In 1996, he was inducted into the Air Force's rarefied "Gathering of Eagles," in company with such legends as Alan Shepard and Chuck Yeager.
Crandall went back to Vietnam in 1967 to 1968, after a year's break from combat. He was there just 16 days when he flew a low-level mission in search of a downed chopper and his own Huey was mistakenly taken down by the Air Force.
He crawled away from an enemy sniper and was rescued by an American crew, but his back was broken and he spent five months recovering in a VA hospital. He spent 24 years in the Army, retiring in 1977, then moved on to a master's in public administration, a stint as a city manager in California and a public works manager in Arizona.
One of Crandall's highlights on the movie set at Fort Benning, Ga., was climbing into the pilot's seat of a beloved Huey -- one owned by a private company. He hadn't flown for years because of two strokes.
Everyone clapped on set when Crandall took to the air: "I came back and buzzed the movie set and flipped it around and landed next to them. And I had the biggest smile on my face you've ever seen," Crandall said.
Gibson and Kinnear asked how it felt. "I said, 'Just like I'd never been away. Everything came back. And they said, 'Just like riding a bicycle.' And I said, 'Oh no, no it's much better than that. More like sex, unless you're really into riding a bicycle.'"
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-I reporter Kristin Dizon can be reached at 206-448-8118 or kristindizon@seattlepi.com.
Page 198
HARDBACK WE WERE SOLDIERS ONCE AND YOUNG
Rear area Operation Officer ( Dick
Merchant ) "the Huey could carry 10 men"
Page 111
Paul Winkel "I had a total of 16 men in my Huey".
Had we burned of enought fuel to lift off?
Formier "It was left up to each pilot how many
men he carried" on later lifts I was carrying
9-12 troops.
UH-1 Huey Helicopter
The most widely used military helicopter, the
Bell UH-1 series Iroquois, better known
as the "Huey", began arriving in Vietnam in 1963.
Before the end of the conflict, more than 5,000
of these versatile aircraft were
introduced into Southeast Asia.
"Hueys" were used for MedEvac, command and
control, and air assault; to transport
personnel and materiel; and as gun ships.
Bell (model 205) UH-1D (1963) had a longer
fuselage than previous models, increased
rotor diameter, increased range, and a more
powerful Lycoming T53-L-11 1100 shp
engine, with growth potential to the Lycoming T53-
L-13 1400 shp engine.
A distinguishing characteristic is the larger
cargo doors, with twin cabin windows, on
each side.
>>The UH-1D, redesigned to carry up to 12 troops,
with a crew of two, reached Vietnam
in 1963.<<
The UH-1D has a range of 293 miles (467km) and a
speed of 127 mph (110 knots).
UH-1D "Hueys" could be armed with M60D door guns,
quad M60Cs on the M6 aircraft armament subsystem,
20mm cannon, 2.75 inch rocket launchers, 40mm
grenade launcher in M5 helicopter chin-turret,
and up to six NATO Standard AGM-22B
( formerly SS-11B ) wire-guided anti-tank
missiles on the M11 or M22 guided missile
launcher.
The UH-1D could also be armed with M60D 7.62mm or
M213 .50 Cal. pintle-mounted
door guns on the M59 armament subsystem.
From: Lzalbany65
To: theveteran@vva.org
Subj: FRAUD= FREEMAN, ED W, Crandall dont deserve
Medal of Honor, His Huey had 2 M-60 machine guns
& 2 door gunners.
Moore told them when it was safe to land.
If he said it was safe to land they did.
If they were told it wasnt safe to land they
didnt.
Medevac Hueys were landing on X-Ray on the 14th,
A CH-47 even picked up the Naplamed Troops.
Crandall, Freemen's Company was the only company that could fly into X-Ray,as they were the Organic, support Aviation company attached to Moore.
After Moore closed X-Ray, Crandall grounded his company and only he and Freemen, Later in the day 2 other Pilots flew all missions.
Then they complaned the were tired from flying all Day 14 missions.
Crandall's Company had 24 Hueys, of the 14 missions 14 Pilots and crews could have gotten combat experence, but then only Crandall, Freemen got all the experence.
All other AirCraft would be barred from entering the Battle area, As they weren part of the Battle group.
To: Benrand
...This particular Naplam Victim died within a
day and that just crushed Landing Zone X-Ray's
UPI War Correspondent Joe Galloway (BARRY
PEPPER).
...I will NEVER FORGET being ordered to go into
that CH-47 Chinook Helicopter fresh from LZ X-Ray
at IA DRANG-1965's Landing Zone Falcon to try and
identify those young Soldiers who had already
been Killed in Action by our own Napalm. NEVER.
30 posted on 03/15/2002 8:01:05 PM PST
by ALOHA RONNIE< Ronnie Guyer
ALOHA RONNIE Guyer-Vet/Battle of IA DRANG1965
http://www.lzxray.com/guyer_collection.htm
CH-47's were picked up the wounded from X-Ray and
taking them to Falcon on the 14th
Nov 1965.
To: Benrand
...This particular Naplam Victim died within a
day and that just crushed Landing Zone X-
Ray's UPI War Correspondent Joe Galloway (BARRY PEPPER).
..."I will NEVER FORGET being ordered to go into
that CH-47 Chinook Helicopter fresh from
LZ X-Ray at IA DRANG-1965's Landing Zone Falcon
to try and identify those young Soldiers
who had already been Killed in Action by our own
Napalm. NEVER".
After refueling, the fourth lift went in at 1332H.
At 1338H the second wave started receiving ground fire.
>>>After this lift was complete, a medevac ship
brought in the Bn Surgeon's team which
reported they already had 20 to 25 WIA's and some
KIA's.
After refueling, the fourth lift went in at 1332H.
At 1338H the second wave started receiving ground fire.
>>>After this lift was complete, a medevac ship brought in the Bn Surgeon's team which
reported they already had 20 to 25 WIA's and some KIA's.
A/229 AVN 1 CAV was a US Army unit
B/229 AVN 1 CAV was a US Army unit
1/9 CAV 1 CAV was a US Army unit
1/7 CAV 1 CAV was a US Army unit
Primary service involved, US Army
Pleiku Province, II Corps, South Vietnam
Location, LZ X-Ray
Description:
0?H 2 A/229th Avn UH-1D's and 2 UH-1B's make a recon flight from Plei Me to Duc Co
and identify 3 possible LZs.
0?H 5 CH-47A's start moving 6 105mm guns to LZ Falcon.
0?H 1/9th Cav Scouts conduct a VR of 2 LZs and the surrounding area.
0852H LZ X-Ray is selected.
By 0930 all 16 A/229th Avn UH-1D's arrive at Plei Me for the CA.
C/2/20th ARA provided support all that day.
1048H the first lift of 8 UH-1Ds landed in X-Ray, the second wave follwed immediately.
1120H the second lift went in.
The 1/7th C&C ship landed at 1140H to extract the NVA POW. <<
1210H the third lift went in and at 1215H contact was made to begin the Battle of LZ X-Ray.
After refueling, the fourth lift went in at 1332H.
At 1338H the second wave started receiving ground fire.
After this lift was complete, a medevac ship brought in the Bn Surgeon's team which
reported they already had 20 to 25 WIA's and some KIA's.
At 1400 the USAF Spad crashed and ARA fire was directed on the NVA moving around the
aircraft.
At 1430 the fifth lift went in and the LZ suddenly turned red-hot.
The Hueys dropped off troops and extracted KIAs and WIAs.
Because the first wave received such heavy fire and took so many hits, the 1/7th cancelled
the second wave.
Two Hueys were dispatched to Camp Holloway to collect ammo.
Two Hueys loaded all the remaining 1/7th ammo at Plei Me and returned to X-Ray.
They extracted 13 WIAs and KIAs on this trip.
The two Hueys from Holloway returned and went into X-Ray, one was shot down in X-Ray
and the crew extracted.
A/229th continued to fly in ammo and extract casualties.
Instead of flying the WIAs all the way to Pleiku, they used LZ Falcon as a transfer point to
the medevac ships.
After three two ship missions, all of A/229th set up a shuttle flying in ammo and water,
taking out casualties.
At 1520H they started bringing in the last of the 1/7th Cav two ships at a time.
A second Huey went down in X-Ray.
Comments: MAJ Crandall, Bruce; A/229th Avn CO; ; CPT Mills, Jon; A/229th Avn pilot; ;
CPT Rickard, ; 1/9th Cav scout leader; ; CWO Lombardo, Riccardo J.; A/229th Avn AC; ;
1LT Bean, Roger K.; A/229th Avn pilot; ; CPT Freeman, Ed; A/229th Avn flight leader; ; CPT
Mesch, Gene; A/229th Avn AC; ; CWO Jekel, Alex S.; A/229th Avn AC; ; MAJ
Bartholomew, Roger J.; C/2/20th ARA CO; ; CPT Washburn, Richard B.; C/2/20th ARA
pilot; ; CPT Winkel, Paul P.; A/229th Avn flight leader; ; CWO Harper, Dallas H.; A/229th
Avn AC; ; CWO Faba, Ken; A/229th Avn AC; ; CWO Komich, Leland C.; A/229th Avn pilot;
; CWO Schramm, Walter; A/229th Avn pilot; ; CWO Estes, Donald C; A/229th Avn AC;
What happend to the XO???
Crandall, "Freemen and I shouldnt be together ( Flying the ammo ), Incase we got shot
down he would be needed to lead the company"
Crandall the CO, Freemen the 1st Platoon leader
They delivered troops, ammunition and water and brought out the dead and wounded.
Col. Moore closed LZ X-Ray. >need time closed or Lift<. Crandall, Freemen flew 14
Missions. < 1hour flight time @110 knots to >Pleiku 40 miles< Tea Plantation 32 miles( Brigiad HeadQuaters Ammo< and return to X-Ray. < How many flight's to >Falcon 5
miles<. what was their A Hour for Crandall, Freemem? Refuling
point's?
As you see they couldnt have flown 14 missions on the Nov 14, 1965
Crandall the Commanding Officer.
Freemen the 1st Platoon leader.
They Ground the rest of their company 20 Huey's and crew's of 4 troops and Flew 14
Mission's themselvs, from Military time 0600 hrs> civilian time 6:00am.
Till 2200 hrs, 10:00pm
They allowed 2 more Huey's to help. what time ??
They were so exashasted when they shut their huey's down at 1000hrs.
Each Huey Crew could have flown 1 mission each and got combat experiance, Instead they
got none.
Crandall's, Freemen POOR Leadership robbed them of thet experiaence by flying all
missions that day.
They Degraded their aircrews preformance the following days, leaving no Huey's to fly the
2/7, 1/5 out of LZ X-Ray on the 17th.
Feild Manual 57-35 Airmobile Operations 1963
Aircrew endurance must be considered.
For planning purposes, the Air Assault Task Force Commander should consider eight hours
a day and four hours of night flying to be a safe limit for aircrews.
If those limits are exceeded during a single period, then degraded aircrew performance can
be expected on the following days.
Remarks by Bruce Crandall - Commander of the helicopters in the IA Drang Valley.
Known by his call sign “Ancient Serpent Six” and several variations of it,
into the firestorm of Landing Zone X-Ray at the Battle of IA Drang in November 1965.
He and his men( Freemen and 2 other Huey crew's ) the rest of the unit were grounded by
Crandall, Moore. delivered troops, ammunition and water and brought out the dead and
wounded.
He and his good friend, Congressional Medal of Honor Winner Ed “Too Tall to Fly” Freemen,
claimed the toughest jobs for themselves, risking their lives repeatedly.
Crandall’s actions at X-Ray have been immortalized in the major motion picture “We Were
Soldiers”, directed by Randall Wallace and starring Mel Gibson as Lt. Colonel Hal Moore
and Greg Kinnear as Major Crandall.
He won the first Helicopter Heroism Award of the Aviation/Space Writers Association, for
two daring nighttime landings under fire to rescue 12 badly wounded soldiers from Captain
Tony Nadal’s Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry in Operation Masher-White Wing in
January 1966. During his two tours in Vietnam Crandall flew lead ship on 756 separate
missions.
Crandall the CO, Freemen 1st Platoon leader.( Whaty happend to the XO? ).
They delivered troops, ammunition and water and brought out the dead and wounded.
Col. Moore closed LZ X-Ray. >need time closed or Lift<. Crandall, Freemen flew 14
Missions. < 1hour flight time @110 knots to >Pleiku 40 miles< Tea Plantation 32 miles
( Brigaid HeadQuaters Ammo< and return to X-Ray. < How many flight's to >Falcon 5
miles<. what was their A Hour for Crandall, Freemem? Refuling
point's?
As you see they couldnt have flown 14 missions on the Nov 14, 1965
Crandall the Commanding Officer.
Freemen the Executive Officer.
They Ground the rest of their company. 20 Huey's and crew's of 4 troops and Flew 14
Mission's themselvs, from Military time 0600 hrs> civilian time 6:00am.
Till 2200 hrs, 10:00pm
They were so exashasted when they shut their huey's down at 1000hrs.
Each Huey Crew could have flown 1 mission each and got combat experiance, Instead they
got none.
Crandall's, Freemen POOR Leadership robbed them of thet experiaence by flying all
missions that day.
They Degraded their aircrews preformance the following days, leaving no Huey's to fly the
2/7, 1/5 out of LZ X-Ray on the 17th.
Feild Manual 57-35 Airmobile Operations 1963
Aircrew endurance must be considered.
For planning purposes, the Air Assault Task Force Commander should consider eight hours
a day and four hours of night flying to be a safe limit for aircrews.
If those limits are exceeded during a single period, then degraded aircrew performance can
be expected on the following days.
ED W. FREEMAN
Captain
Company A, 229 Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division
Ia Drang Valley, Republic of Vietnam
14 November 1965
Captain Ed W. Freeman, United States Army, distinguished himself by numerous acts of conspicuous gallantry and extraordinary intrepidity on 14 November 1965 while serving with Company A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). As a flight leader and second in command of a 16-helicopter lift unit, he supported a heavily engaged American infantry battalion at Landing Zone X-Ray in the Ia Drang Valley, Republic of Vietnam. The unit was almost out of ammunition after taking some of the heaviest casualties of the war, fighting off a relentless attack from a highly motivated, heavily armed enemy force. When the infantry commander closed the helicopter landing zone due to intense direct enemy fire, Captain Freeman risked his own life by flying his unarmed helicopter through a gauntlet of enemy fire time after time, delivering critically needed ammunition, water and medical supplies to the besieged battalion. His flights had a direct impact on the battle's outcome by providing the engaged units with timely supplies of ammunition critical to their survival, without which they would almost surely have gone down, with much greater loss of life. After medical evacuation helicopters refused to fly into the area due to intense enemy fire, Captain Freeman flew 14 separate rescue missions, providing life-saving evacuation of an estimated 30 seriously wounded soldiers -- some of whom would not have survived had he not acted. All flights were made into a small emergency landing zone within 100 to 200 meters of the defensive perimeter where heavily committed units were perilously holding off the attacking elements. Captain Freeman's selfless acts of great valor, extraordinary perseverance and intrepidity were far above and beyond the call of duty or mission and set a superb example of leadership and courage for all of his peers. Captain Freeman's extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit and the United States Army.
On 14 November 1965, he commanded the helicopters involved in supporting the 1/7th Cavalry's assault into LZ X-Ray in the IaDrang Valley campaign. This battle was the first meeting of an American battalion-sized unit against a far larger force of Vietnamese Regular Army troops. It was arguably the fiercest battle of the whole war and resulted in the most casualties suffered by units on both sides. Crandall's contributions can best be described by Lt General Harold G. Moore (the LTC and Battlefield Commander of the Infantry units in X-Ray) when he wrote in his book "We Were Soldiers Once and Young".
Then Major, Crandall and his wingman, then Captain, Ed W. Freeman (who later received the Medal of Honor for his actions) flew a total of 22 missions into X-Ray, 14 of which were voluntary ammunition, medical resupply and medical evacuation flights. Twelve of these fourteen were made after the Med Evac unit responsible for evacuating casualties refused to enter the intensely hot landing zone. Crandall's helicopters evacuated more than 75 casualties during a flight day that started at 0600 hours and ended at 2230 hours, more than 16 hours later.
BIOGRAPHY OF BRUCE P. CRANDALL
Then Major Bruce P. Crandall was assigned as Commanding Officer of "A" Company, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in the Republic of Vietnam in 1965-66. In this position, he had command of 20 UH- I (Huey) helicopters and flew the lead helicopter on over 750 combat missions, leading as many as 60 lift helicopters plus their gunship and aerial rocket artillery support helicopters on air assaults in the central highlands of RVN. In addition to these flights, he volunteered and flew a number of medical evacuation rescue flights which he undertook after the Medical Evacuation Unit responsible for these missions refused to fly due to the, intense enemy fire in the pick-up zones. Two of these volunteer missions, 14 November 1965 and 31 January 1966 received special recognition. The November 1965 missions into LZ X-Ray in the IaDrang Valley was recognized in a number of books written on the battle including We Were Soldiers Once and Young written by Lt General Harold G. Moore, Commanding Officer of the Infantry units in X-Ray; and, Joseph Galloway, a combat reporter who was in the LZ during the battle. (There is currently a movie in production of this book.) Crandall led the helicopter operations during this fierce battle which was the first meeting between a major force of North Vietnamese Regulars and a battalion-sized U.S. military unit. The January 1966 rescue was recognized by the Aviation and Space Writers Association for their first "Helicopter Heroism Award". This rescue was selected from an international field of nominees, both military and civilian, as the outstanding act of heroism involving a helicopter. At the twentieth anniversary of this award, the organization ranked Crandall's rescue as the most outstanding in the 20 years of the award. Crandall was also inducted into the elite "Gathering of Eagles" by the United States Air Force in 1996. He is one of only seven Army aviators so honored. The Gathering of Eagles is the only international organization dedicated to recognizing outstanding achievements relating to both civilian and military aviation throughout the world.
Bruce Crandall was born and raised in Olympia, Washington. He graduated from Olympia High School in 1951 and was a high school All State/All American baseball player that year. In January 1953 he was drafted into the Army. He was commissioned in 1954 from Engineer Officers Candidate School and went directly to fixed wing flight school. Subsequent to that he went through helicopter flight school. His flying assignments during the next eight years were mapping missions which included tours in the Arctic, in the desert of North Africa and in the jungles of Central and South America. His ground assignments were as Commanding Officer of Combat Engineer Companies on two separate occasions during this period. In 1963, he was reassigned to the 11th Air Assault Division at Ft Benning where he spent the next two years helping develop the helicopter air assault procedures and doctrine later followed in Vietnam by units he led there. In early 1965 he was sent to the Dominican Republic as the senior staff officer and Liaison officer to the XVIII Airborne Corps for the Division's helicopters attached to the expeditionary forces in that action. Upon returning to Ft Benning, his Division was redesignated the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and he deployed to Vietnam as Commanding Officer of A Company, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division. In this position, he commanded a unit with 20 lift helicopters supporting combat assaults for 13 months in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. During the year he flew the lead helicopter on over 750 missions involving as many of 60 lift ships and a number of gun and rocket support helicopters. He also volunteered and flew a number of medical evacuation missions when Med Evac pilots refused to go because of intense enemy fire in the pick-up zones. Crandall's most noted flights were those that took place on 14 November 1965 and on 31 January 1966.
On 14 November 1965, he commanded the helicopters involved in supporting the 1/7th Cavalry's assault into LZ X-Ray in the IaDrang Valley campaign. This battle was the first meeting of an American battalion-sized unit against a far larger force of Vietnamese Regular Army troops. It was arguably the fiercest battle of the whole war and resulted in the most casualties suffered by units on both sides. Crandall's contributions can best be described by Lt General Harold G. Moore (the LTC and Battlefield Commander of the Infantry units in X-Ray) when he wrote in his book "We Were Soldiers Once and Young".
Then Major, Crandall and his wingman, then Captain, Ed W. Freeman (who later received the Medal of Honor for his actions) flew a total of 22 missions into X-Ray, 14 of which were voluntary ammunition, medical resupply and medical evacuation flights. Twelve of these fourteen were made after the Med Evac unit responsible for evacuating casualties refused to enter the intensely hot landing zone. Crandall's helicopters evacuated more than 75 casualties during a flight day that started at 0600 hours and ended at 2230 hours, more than 16 hours later.
On 31 January 1966, Crandall had just finished a flight day supporting the 1/1 2th Infantry Battalion who was heavily engaged on the Bong Son Plain along the central coast of Vietnam At dusk, en route to refuel and to shut down for the night, he was informed that "X' Company of the 1/7th, a unit he frequently supported, was in heavy contact and had a number of wounded that prevented them from breaking contact and maneuvering to a more secure area. Crandall refueled and decided to fly to the area and see if he could help By now it was pitch dark with an overcast sky which made flight difficult. He found the area because of the heavy explosions and tracer fire. He contacted the Infantry Commander Captain Tony Nadal, his friend and a fellow veteran of X-Ray and learned he had 12 seriously wounded that needed evacuation and that he had a very limited pick-up zone surrounded by trees on three sides. He also learned that Mod Evac had refused the flight during daylight hours and that the Infantry now held only a very small perimeter. The wounded were located in the center of the area where the helicopter would have to WW. Crandall's Battalion Commander, LTC Robert Kellar, was overhead in his Command Helicopter with the Infantry Brigade Commander, Colonel Harold G. Moore. They broke in on the radio to warn Crandall not to attempt the rescue if he wasn't real confident he could do so safely. They warned they did not want a helicopter downed to add to their problems that night. Crandall decided to attempt the rescue himself; in two flights, evacuating six each time. He also decided to do so without the use of search or landing lights in order to give the enemy less of a target for his aircraft but more importantly, so as not to backlight the troopers defending the perimeter and spot fighting the wounded where he was landing. He decided to land to a flashlight that he asked the Infantry Commander to put in the center of the touchdown area. He intended to approach straight down on to the flashlight in order to minimize his chances of striking the unseen trees. He had to abort his first approach when the light was turned off due to enemy fire. Captain Nadal took control of the flashlight and the next landing under intense enemy fire was successful. Crandall made a second lift under the same conditions as the first and successfully rescued 12 wounded.
Crandall received the Aviation and Space Writers Association Helicopter Heroism Award for the year 1966 for this rescue. At the 20th annual award ceremony for the award, his flights were ranked as number one over the first 20 years. Crandall was also nominated as the Army Aviator of the Year from the 1st Cavalry Division.
UH-1 Huey Helicopter
The most widely used military helicopter, the Bell UH-1 series Iroquois, better known as the
"Huey", began arriving in Vietnam in 1963.
Before the end of the conflict, more than 5,000 of these versatile aircraft were introduced into Southeast Asia.
"Hueys" were used for MedEvac, command and control, and air assault; to transport
personnel and materiel; and as gun ships.
Considered to be the most widely used helicopter in the world, with more than 9,000 produced from the 1950s to the present, the Huey is flown today by about 40 countries.
Bell (model 205) UH-1D (1963) had a longer fuselage than previous models, increased rotor
diameter, increased range, and a more powerful Lycoming T53-L-11 1100 shp engine, with
growth potential to the Lycoming T53-L-13 1400 shp engine.
A distinguishing characteristic is the larger cargo doors, with twin cabin windows, on each
side.
>>The UH-1D, redesigned to carry up to 12 troops, with a crew of two, reached Vietnam in
1963. <<
The UH-1D has a range of 293 miles (467km) and a speed of 127 mph (110 knots).
UH-1Ds were build under license in Germany.
UH-1D "Hueys" could be armed with M60D door guns, quad M60Cs on the M6 aircraft
armament subsystem, 20mm cannon, 2.75 inch rocket launchers, 40mm grenade launcher
in M5 helicopter chin-turret, and up to six NATO Standard AGM-22B (formerly SS-11B) wire-
guided anti-tank missiles on the M11 or M22 guided missile launcher.
The UH-1D could also be armed with M60D 7.62mm or M213 .50 Cal. pintle-mounted door
guns on the M59 armament subsystem.
Remarks by Bruce Crandall - Commander of the helicopters in the IA Drang Valley.
Known by his call sign “Ancient Serpent Six” and several variations of it, Crandall led some of the bravest helicopter pilots in the world into the firestorm of Landing Zone X-Ray at the Battle of IA Drang in November 1965.
He and his men delivered troops, ammunition and water and brought out the dead and
wounded.
>>He and his good friend, Congressional Medal of Honor Winner Ed “Too Tall to Fly”
Freemen, claimed the toughest jobs for themselves, risking their lives repeatedly. <<
Crandall and Freemens actions dosent meet the
standard for the Medal Of Honor.
THREE MEDAL's OF HONOR the highest Medel for one
Battle?? FOR 1 BATTLE.
SOMETHING IS WRONG FOR THAT AMOUNT OF HIGH MEDALS.
Date: 5/14/2003 12:31:57 PM Pacific Daylight Time
From: Lzalbany65
To: senator@sessions.senate.gov
Subj: FRAUD= FREEMAN, ED W, Crandall dont deserve Medal of Honor, His Huey had 2 M-60
Date: 5/14/2003 12:30:43 PM Pacific Daylight Time
From: Lzalbany65
To: john_mccain@mccain.senate.gov
Subj: ural to Moore's after action report, Medevac huey's were landing X-Ray on the 14
Date: 5/13/2003 1:20:40 AM Pacific Daylight Time
From: Lzalbany65
To: Xav8er
I thought I would let you know 1st about Moore, Galloway, Crandall all LIERS,
Freeman was their DUPE.
ural to Moore's after action Report, and Opreation Order For Nov. 14, 1965
http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/history/aar-xray.pdf
Moore's after action Report LZ X-Ray Nov 14,1965 page 7 Par E-1 near bottom of page
NOV 14 1965 Moore "I did not call in the Med evac Helicopter too frenquently"
so the Med evac Huey's did and were landing on the 14 Nov 1965.
Who ever put them in for the Medal of Honer is a LIER.
Med evac Helicopters were LANDING at X-Ray.
Moore called Crandall and Freeman to land when fire on X-Ray was light.
Crandall and Freeman's unit were the only one's that could land at X-Ray.
Crandall grounded his unit, only crandall, Freeman flew mission's.
Crandall abandonded his aircraft, and flew as Co-Pilot to Freeman.
Crandall was required to pick up wounded troops< FM 7-20, FM 57-35
Moore should have been charged with Mansalughter, Deriliction of Duty( He didnt know what he was doing ). His Operation Order show's that.
After the battle Crandall, Moore and Mill's went to an Officer's Bar, after Moore wouldnt be served and was ask to leave, Moore then said he was going to KILL everyone in the Bar AMERICAN TROOPS.
Crandall, Mill's took their pistols out of their holsters and placed them on the Bar Moore placed his Rifle on the Bar.
the Bartender ran to get the Officer of the Day and came back to the bar.
a clear violation of art 128 UCMJ.
Crandall
he volunteered and flew a number of medical evacuation rescue flights which he undertook after the Medical Evacuation Unit responsible for these missions refused to fly due to the, intense enemy fire in the pick-up zones. Two of these volunteer missions, 14 November 1965
BIOGRAPHY OF BRUCE P. CRANDALL
Then Major Bruce P. Crandall was assigned as Commanding Officer of "A" Company, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in the Republic of Vietnam in 1965-66. In this position, he had command of 20 UH- I (Huey) helicopters and flew the lead helicopter on over 750 combat missions, leading as many as 60 lift helicopters plus their gunship and aerial rocket artillery support helicopters on air assaults in the central highlands of RVN. In addition to these flights, he volunteered and flew a number of medical evacuation rescue flights which he undertook after the Medical Evacuation Unit responsible for these missions refused to fly due to the, intense enemy fire in the pick-up zones. Two of these volunteer missions, 14 November 1965 and 31 January 1966 received special recognition. The November 1965 missions into LZ X-Ray in the IaDrang Valley was recognized in a number of books written on the battle including We Were Soldiers Once and Young written by Lt General Harold G. Moore, Commanding Officer of the Infantry units in X-Ray; and, Joseph Galloway, a combat reporter who was in the LZ during the battle. (There is currently a movie in production of this book.) Crandall led the helicopter operations during this fierce battle which was the first meeting between a major force of North Vietnamese Regulars and a battalion-sized U.S. military unit. The January 1966 rescue was recognized by the Aviation and Space Writers Association for their first "Helicopter Heroism Award". This rescue was selected from an international field of nominees, both military and civilian, as the outstanding act of heroism involving a helicopter. At the twentieth anniversary of this award, the organization ranked Crandall's rescue as the most outstanding in the 20 years of the award. Crandall was also inducted into the elite "Gathering of Eagles" by the United States Air Force in 1996. He is one of only seven Army aviators so honored. The Gathering of Eagles is the only international organization dedicated to recognizing outstanding achievements relating to both civilian and military aviation throughout the world.
Bruce Crandall was born and raised in Olympia, Washington. He graduated from Olympia High School in 1951 and was a high school All State/All American baseball player that year. In January 1953 he was drafted into the Army. He was commissioned in 1954 from Engineer Officers Candidate School and went directly to fixed wing flight school. Subsequent to that he went through helicopter flight school. His flying assignments during the next eight years were mapping missions which included tours in the Arctic, in the desert of North Africa and in the jungles of Central and South America. His ground assignments were as Commanding Officer of Combat Engineer Companies on two separate occasions during this period. In 1963, he was reassigned to the 11th Air Assault Division at Ft Benning where he spent the next two years helping develop the helicopter air assault procedures and doctrine later followed in Vietnam by units he led there. In early 1965 he was sent to the Dominican Republic as the senior staff officer and Liaison officer to the XVIII Airborne Corps for the Division's helicopters attached to the expeditionary forces in that action. Upon returning to Ft Benning, his Division was redesignated the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and he deployed to Vietnam as Commanding Officer of A Company, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division. In this position, he commanded a unit with 20 lift helicopters supporting combat assaults for 13 months in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. During the year he flew the lead helicopter on over 750 missions involving as many of 60 lift ships and a number of gun and rocket support helicopters.
He also volunteered and flew a number of medical evacuation missions when Med Evac pilots refused to go because of intense enemy fire in the pick-up zones.
Crandall's most noted flights were those that took place on 14 November 1965 and on 31 January 1966.
On 14 November 1965, he commanded the helicopters involved in supporting the 1/7th Cavalry's assault into LZ X-Ray in the IaDrang Valley campaign. This battle was the first meeting of an American battalion-sized unit against a far larger force of Vietnamese Regular Army troops. It was arguably the fiercest battle of the whole war and resulted in the most casualties suffered by units on both sides. Crandall's contributions can best be described by Lt General Harold G. Moore (the LTC and Battlefield Commander of the Infantry units in X-Ray) when he wrote in his book "We Were Soldiers Once and Young".
Then Major, Crandall and his wingman, then Captain, Ed W. Freeman (who later received the Medal of Honor for his actions) flew a total of 22 missions into X-Ray, 14 of which were voluntary ammunition, medical resupply and medical evacuation flights. Twelve of these fourteen were made after the Med Evac unit responsible for evacuating casualties refused to enter the intensely hot landing zone. Crandall's helicopters evacuated more than 75 casualties during a flight day that started at 0600 hours and ended at 2230 hours, more than 16 hours later.
On 31 January 1966, Crandall had just finished a flight day supporting the 1/1 2th Infantry Battalion who was heavily engaged on the Bong Son Plain along the central coast of Vietnam At dusk, en route to refuel and to shut down for the night, he was informed that "X' Company of the 1/7th, a unit he frequently supported, was in heavy contact and had a number of wounded that prevented them from breaking contact and maneuvering to a more secure area. Crandall refueled and decided to fly to the area and see if he could help By now it was pitch dark with an overcast sky which made flight difficult. He found the area because of the heavy explosions and tracer fire. He contacted the Infantry Commander Captain Tony Nadal, his friend and a fellow veteran of X-Ray and learned he had 12 seriously wounded that needed evacuation and that he had a very limited pick-up zone surroun
