The division was in reserve near Sopa, Korea. The 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry was primarily concerned with a training program, beginning on 26 October, with marksmanship training in individual weapons, crew served weapons, squad and platoon field training exercises. On 16 November, division units began moving into line to relieve elements of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st Commonwealth Division on Line JAMESTOWN. The relief was completed 20 November. As finally disposed, units on the line from left to right were 7th Infantry, 15th Infantry, 65th Infantry, and 8th Cavalry.

The Chinese started an attack with probes along the entire line on the morning of 21 November and with their primary assault against the positions of the 8th Cavalry in the vicinity of Hill 287. The probes continued at various points throughout the next day. The 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry occupied Hill 355. The 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry -- under the operational control of the 7th Infantry -- was in blocking positions on Hill 238, about 2500 yards generally east of Hill 355. At about four o’clock in the afternoon of 23 November, the enemy started bombarding Hill 355 with a heavy concentration of mortar and artillery fire, followed by an infantry assault at 1640 hours. Within an hour, a Chinese mass swarmed over the hill and pushed the defending elements of Company E southward off the crest. The key positions on Hill 355 were now in Chinese hands.

In the meantime, the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry was alerted for action. In time, the2d Battalion was ordered to move westward along the ridge, which joined the slops of Hill 355 from the southwest. When the battalion reached the checkpoint nearest Hill 355, Major Frank E. Burdell, the Battalion Commander, was instructed to use his entire battalion, if necessary, to retake Hill 355. He moved his force westward in darkness. Exceedingly wild and rough terrain and old wire entanglements hampered the march. Progress was necessarily slow. All the while, artillery and mortar fire was directed continuously upon the Chinese assembly areas, routes of approach, and the crest of Hill 355.

Shortly before three o’clock in the morning of 24 November, Major Frank E. Burdell reported that Company F was on checkpoint ABLE, less than 1000 yards from the crest of “Dagmar.” Company E and Company G, Captain Jack C. Zimmerman, commanding, were in route. The Battalion Commander had planned originally to attack with one company along the ridgeline from the southeast and another company from the south. After reaching ABLE, however, he determined to attack as soon possible along the ridgeline only. Pressure against the line on the eastern portion of Hill 355 had eased; he thought it wise to take advantage of the situation as it existed without waiting for a company to get in position during darkness for the attack from the south.

Company F led the attack straight up the hill. The climb alone required all out effort on the part of every man. They had spent the night in torturous march. It was cold. Ice patches on the flanks of Hill 355 impeded the struggle upward. They worked their way toward the crest, yard after weary yard. Two-thirds of the way up the hill, they found the Chinese. Men began dropping from small arms fire and grenades received from positions above them. The others kept on pressing forward. At 0505 hours, lead elements were so close to the crest of the hill that artillery and mortar fire, pounding the objective area, had to be shifted. A half hour later, men of Company F were on the crest itself. The peak still had to be taken.

The 2d Battalion of the 15th Infantry continued its attack to clear the western end of the hill. It was imperative to complete the job as soon as possible. Strong Chinese troop units could be observed heading toward Hill 355 despite British and U.S. artillery fire, which was ripping into their formations. On the hill, the Chinese fought fanatically to hold the peaks. Company E of the 15th Infantry passed through Company F and continued toward the western promontory. Company F was directed to tie in with Company F, 7th Infantry. In the middle of the afternoon, Major Burdell committed Company G to the left of Company E. The men of Company G fought desperately to clean out the remaining Chinese still holding out on the peak. At this time, an unusual situation developed. Lt Colonel Sullivan reported at 1800 hours that Company F of his battalion was under attack and that Company G was about to secure the western end of the hill. Friendly elements and the Chinese were fighting both offensive and defensive actions on the objective only a few hundred yards apart. At 1843 hours Company G, 15th Infantry reported that the objective was taken.

The Chinese attack mounted in fury and strength. On the far left, the Canadians were hard pressed. Company G barely had time to report that it had taken its objective before receiving a heavy counterattack. Within a short time, the entire 2d Battalion was in the midst of a furious struggle. The conflict spread to the right and Companies I and L of the 7th Infantry also were engaged.

On the western tip of Hill 355, Company G’s situation became critical. About 1730 hours, the Chinese drove a wedge between Company G and Company E on its right and began moving through the gap and behind company G. Pressure on the front continued unabated. Fighting stubbornly, Company G was forced from its positions on the hill but not off the hill itself. The infantrymen, still an effective unit, set up a perimeter part way down the slop and prepared to prevent the Chinese from coming through. The Chinese did not try it. Instead, they swung the full weight of their attack against Companies E and F of the 2d battalion on line to the right.

Companies E and F of the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry were holding firmly against powerful assaults in the early hours after midnight, 25 November.

While the battle raged on the hill, it was decided that Lt Colonel Thompson, 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry was to make an assault to recover the position which Company G of the 15th Infantry had won and then lost. This outfit, exhausted but still in a fighting mood, was holding its perimeter part way down the side of Hill 355 waiting for the Chinese to come down, but was in no condition to go up after him.

Company G, 7th Infantry was to be the assault company.

The company reached its positions at 0330 hours the morning of 25 November and struck out to the north toward the top of “Dagmar.” It began to snow. Through the remainder of the night, Company C struggled upward, slipping and sliding, stumbling and falling, but gained ground. The darkness and the storm provided an advantage. The Chinese could not employ observed fire to halt the advance. The infantrymen inched their way upward expecting each step to be met with a burst of fire. An amazing thing happened. At eight in the morning, it was still snowing, but the visibility improved sufficiently for observers to see Company C on the ridge. Less than an hour later, the entire hill was occupied. There was not a living Chinese soldier there both able and willing to fight. The battle for “Dagmar” was over.

Source: 3d Infantry Division in Korea, by Captain Max W. Dolcater, Editor, Headquarters 3d Infantry Division, G3 Section, pp. 287-294. The text herein is limited to the history and chronology of the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry.