CLEANUP was a ‘stinker’ from beginning to end. There was no help for it. The weather had been good and was expected to remain so. Yet it had been the weather that slowed down the attack sufficiently to permit the enemy to perceive where it was headed and rush reinforcements to the threatened objectives.

The job had to be done. CLEANUP II was planned. The new operation called for several changes in maneuver based upon experience gained in the previous operation and upon realization that the Chinese Communists Forces now held the objectives in strength and were expecting trouble.

The new plan called for the 15th Infantry to seize Hill 487. The 65th Infantry was to take a set of two unmarked hills called Twin Peaks, secure Hill 292 and prepare to seize Hill 477 on order. Both regiments were to be supported by elements of the 64th Heavy Tank Battalion. The 7th Infantry would remain in Division reserve with a company of the 64th, the 3d Reconnaissance Company and the 20th Battalion Combat Team. While the attack was being prepared, artillery, tanks and aircraft would pound the enemy positions to soften them up.

In the nine days before D-Day, more than 45,000 rounds of artillery, mortar and tank fire were directed on the objective area. A large part of this preparatory fire was delivered by tanks, which were maneuvered into positions from which gunners could shoott directly into enemy bunkers.

CLEANUP II began on schedule.

The 15th Infantry began its attack on Hill 487 at 0230 hours the morning of 29 September with the 2d Battalion, Lt Colonel Jack R. Gates, commanding, pushing toward the southern half of the hill mass and Lt Colonel Edward N. Hathaway’s 1st Battalion directing its efforts toward the northern portion.

Company E, the 2d Battalion’s assault company, secured the southern peak shortly after 0600 hours by storming the enemy trenches and bunkers and engaging in a grenade-throwing contest. The Chinese lost.

In the first hours of CLEANUP, fighting had been sharp, but substantial gains were made. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 15th Infantry continued their job of cleaning out Hill 487 and securing their objectives. Then, about nine in the morning, thick fog settled in the mountains and it began to rain. Visibility was limited to 50 feet. Aircraft were grounded. It was the first bad weather since CLEANUP I! Infantrymen slipped and skidded about the slimy muck on the steep slopes, which were almost completely devoid of vegetation. Vehicular traffic was slowed to a snail’s pace and tanks began to bog down. The foul weather offered only one advantage--the Chinese defenders were unable to make effective use of mortar and artillery, which they had in abundance.

In the 15th Infantry’s area, the 1st Battalion withdrew behind friendly lines, and Lt Colonel Jack Gates was given the mission of holding the newly won Hill 487. The men dug in with a will for two excellent reasons. The enemy was plastering the hilltop with almost continuous mortar and artillery fire. Further, it was too much to expect the Chinese would let the highly prized high ground go by the board without an attempt to recover it. The expectation was prophetic. The Chinese hurled three assaults at Company F’s positions on the north side of the perimeter during the night. The final attack, launched in company strength, reached the defender’s forward fighting holes and there was stopped. All positions were held.

On 30 September, the Borinqueneer 3d Battalion renewed its attack through the rainstorm to secure the second of the Twin Peaks. Company G, 15th Infantry moved off Hill 487 and took up firing positions from which they could support the attack. Aided by the additional fire support, the 3d Battalion of the 65th Infantry seized the peak in mid-afternoon. Company G returned to the perimeter on Hill 487 while the 3d Battalion, 65th Infantry dug in on the objective.

At this time, changes in plans for CLEANUP II were made necessary by receipt of orders from I Corp for Operation COMMANDO.

CLEANUP II had been a Division operation conceived and executed for the purpose of improving positions and promoting security. COMMANDO extended this design by requiring an advance by all Corps elements to Line JAMESTOWN. JAMESTOWN was so outlined that its possession would secure a railhead line from Uijongbu to Yonchon, Chorwon and Kumhwa. A secure railhead to these points would simplify the supply problem in the entire Corps zone particularly during the coming winter. In fact, supply had developed into a tremendous headache. Division’s forward elements were many miles from supply points. Organic transportation was being beaten to bits by the continuous hauling over rough roads and still could not maintain supply without assistance from Corps. With increased requirements for cold weather operations, the difficulties of truck transportation with available equipment would become all but insurmountable.

With CLEANUP II already in progress, it was not difficult for Division to alter plans in order to achieve the objective of COMMANDO for which D-Day was 3 October. The 15th Infantry would continue its attack from Hill 487 along the ridgeline to the west to secure Hill 477, which was a feature of JAMESTOWN. The 3d Battalion, 65th Infantry would continue its attack to seize Hill 292 to the west of Twin Peaks. The 7th Infantry would move into the center of the Division zone while the 65th Infantry would be responsible for the right sectors respectively.

However, on 1 and 2 October, the 3d Battalion of the 15th Infantry and the 65th Infantry made slow progress against a stubborn enemy fighting desperately for every foot of ground. The broken terrain channelized maneuver into restricted approaches upon which the Chinese defensive positions were expertly sited. Frontal assaults and grenade duels were common, and it usually was necessary to shovel the enemy out of their holes with bayonet points. The bunkers had to be eliminated one by one.

On D-Day (3 October), Lt Colonel Jack Gate’s 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry created a hole in the enemy defenses by seizing the ridgeline between Hills 487 and 477. The Chinese still threw back the attempts by the 3d Battalion of the 15th Infantry to take Hill 477 itself, but were unable to dislodge the 2d Battalion when they counterattacked that night.

On 4 October, the attack again was renewed, and assigned objectives were taken quickly.

On Hill 477, the picture was not so bright. At 1015 hours, Lt Colonel Dereus’ 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry had one company on the hill. Fifteen minutes later, the company drove off an assault by an estimated 200 Chinese soldiers, and continued to prepare defensive positions as swiftly as possible. Before the job could be completed, the Chinese launched another attack in increased strength and forced the defenders to withdraw from the hill. Efforts of Lt Colonel Gates to move elements of the 2d Battalion along the ridge to assist the 3d Battalion were ineffective. The enemy laid a curtain of mortar and artillery fire across the ridgeline, which was effective in halting the relief mission. Since the 3d Battalion had no opportunity to dig in for the night, the 3d Reconnaissance Company was placed under its control to bolster defenses in the event of an enemy attack during the night. The night passed without incident.

On the morning of 5 October, weary, grimy soldiers of the 3d Battalion cast speculative glances along the crest of Hill 477 and prepared themselves for the fight of their lives. The attack got under way. They took Hill 477 without firing a shot!

When it was discovered that the Chinese had withdrawn, an immediate advance was directed to occupy Line JAMESTOWN. The mission was accomplished on 5 and 6 October.

The Division set about rigging JAMESTOWN for defense. Troops dug and wired in positions with the reminder that they were under enemy observation and vulnerable to artillery fire. Infantrymen needed no urging to go underground in view of these circumstances.

Engineers surveyed the entire zone to establish roads necessary to support the new positions. They selected routes protected insofar as possible from enemy fire.

During this period, there were a number of changes in command and staff personnel at Division. On 15 October, Brigadier General Armistead D. Mead, Assisted Division Commander, departed for the United States. Colonel Oliver P. Newman, who had been Division’s Chief of Staff since the autumn of 1946, took his position. Lt Colonel Wilson M. Hawkins, formerly commander of the 64th Heavy Tank Battalion was appointed Chief of Staff.

On 20 October, Major General Robert H. Soule also departed for the United States to begin a new assignment with Headquarters Army Field Forces; Brigadier General Thomas J. Cross assumed command of the Division.

Meanwhile, plans were being considered whereby the enemy might be dislodged from some of the points from which he enjoyed observation of Line JAMESTOWN.

Before the plans could be completed and executed, a most welcome order arrived from I Corps. The 3d Infantry Division would be relieved by the 9th ROK Division and would go into Corps reserve.

The relief began on 17 October and, on the 23d, the last of the Division units closed in the reserve area northeast of Uijongbu.

With the exception of a few days at the end of April, the Division has been in action continuously since January 1951.

Source: 3d Infantry Division in Korea, by Captain Max W. Dolcater, Editor, Headquarters, 3d Infantry Division, G-3 Section, pp. 248-258. The text is limited primarily to the history and chronology of the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry.

The plan called for an attack on Hill 487 by two battalions and on Twin Peaks east of Hill 292 with one battalion. Two battalions would assault Hill 477 as soon as 487 was secured. The circled area was the objective of Company G, 15th Infantry during Operation COMMANDO, 3 October 1951.